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On 5 December 1978 the European Council entrusted us with a mandate to con-
sider adjustments to the machinery and procedures of the Community institu-
tions. The full text of the European Council's mandate is appended to this Report
as Annex 1. We shall explain in the body of the Report the practical conception
of our task and of its limitations which has guided us in our work. There are
however, two points we should like to make here. First, we understood the man-
date to mean that we should not make proposals which demanded Treaty
amendment. Secondly, we regarded the European Council's reference to 'specific
proposals... which may be implemented swiftly' as a determining factorfn d~cid-
ing the character of the proposals we should make. We have however permitted
ourselves certain wider reflections in the final chapter of our Report.
Our Committee first assembled in Brussels on 18 December 1978. Since then we
have visited all the Member States of the Community and have had discussions
with Heads of State and Government and with Foreign and other Ministers. We
have held meetings with the then President of the European Parliament, the Pre-
sident of the Commission, the European Court of Justice, the Economic and So-
cial Committee and the European Court of Auditors, and also with the Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives and the Council Secretariat. We have met the
Committee set up under Ambassador Spierenburg to study the functioning of
the Commission. We have also had discussions, separately, with many others
including Members of the Commission, officials of the Commission and of Mem-
ber Governments and many other individuals. We have received a number of
written representations.
We are grateful to Heads of State and Government for devoting considerable
time to explaining to us their purpose in inviting us to undertake this responsibili-
ty. We should like to thank them and other members of the Governments and
the institutions and organs of the Community who contributed to our work for
the hospitality with which they received us, and the frank and thoughtful manner
in which they expressed their views. We are grateful to all the many other indivi-
duals and organizations who offered their ideas and expertise. Our special thanksare due to the members of the Council Secretariat, particul~Jrly Mr Paul Gueben
who supported us in the organization of our tasks; and to our assistants Alyson
Baires, Philippe Petit and Carlo Trojan, without whose dedicated work this Report
could not have been completed by the date required by the mandate.
With these words of explanation acknowledgment and thanks, and on our own
entire responsibility, we present our Report to the European Council.
October 1979
~~.
Barend Biesheuvel
o.---~ 
Edmund Dell
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PageI. Introduction
We have been asked to report on the adjustments to the machinery and proce-
dures of the institutions which are required for the proper operation of the Com-
munities, and for progress towards European Union. This mandate reflects, as
we see it, both a hope and a concern. The hope is that the European Communi-
ty, in the changed circumstances brought about by the accession of new States,
direct elections to the European Parliament and the development of the Euro-
pean Monetary System, will be able to deepen and extend co-operation among
its members; and that the goals laid down both in and beyond the Treaties can
be brought nearer realization and new agreed objectives added to them. The
concern is that this may prove a very difficult task, and that the Community
present methods of functioning, far from allowing the new challenges to be
faced with confidence, may be showing themselves inadequate even for the de-
mands of today.
The terms of our mandate require us to seek procedural and mechanical adjust-
ments which will allay the concern and allow the hope to be realized. We must
state clearly at the outset that we do not believe a solution can be found in such
simple terms. An analysis of the reasons for concern  the failures, omissions
and inadequacies in Community performance  will show that their deeper cau-
ses are not mechanical or procedural. If the desire of Member States for progress
has not been realized despite joint declarations and agreed deadlines, it is not be-
cause the structures for implementing the latter did not exist. More important
were the political and economic strains that discouraged initiative and limited re-
sources, and the lack of clear guidelines for advance such as existed at an earlier
stage. If the general agreements on directions for progress have not been trans~
latedinto specific action programmes, genuine new ' common policies , it is not
because the forums for discussing them were absent. The reasons lie rather in
political circumstances and attitudes that sometimes produced conflicting con-
ceptions of the right way forward, and sometimes produced no clear conception
at all.
In these conditions the role of the machinery and institutional procedures is a
strictly secondary one. The substantive problems may be aggravated when themachinery and procedures are cumbersome and inappropriate. Our discussions
with those experienced in Community affairs show that this has all too often
been the case. If so, by correcting what is faulty in the mechanics we may hope
to remove one additional and gratuitous obstacle to progress. But we cannot
guarantee progress thereby, either in the existing or in the enlarged Community.
Progress would require that the Community be able to break through the under-
lying economic and political constraints which currently constitute the main ob'"
stacles to advance, and thus to establish a practical consensus on the path as
well as the goals for development. Such a task lies far beyond the scope of our
report. In our studies we have, however, been confronted at every turn with the
problems of substance as well as procedure that inhibit progress towards Euro-
pean Union, and we have been struck in particular by the gravity of the difficul-
ties likely to face the Community in the 1980s quite independently of its internal
organization. We shall offer some thoughts on this in the closing section of our
report, after completing our practical proposals.
The first part of this report consists of an analysis of how the Communities are
performing at present. To achieve objectivity when dealing with the present-day
Community is not easy: the same facts will be seen as cause for reassurance by
some, as cause for concern by others. We have limited ourselves as far as pos-
sible to the facts themselves, taking account of ideological differences only where
they have, by obstructing agreement, proved an obstacle to progress in their
own right.
The State of the Community: the Positive Side
The credit side is presented first here because it is all too often overlooked or un-
dervalued. In fact the achievements of the Community are impressive both for
their richness and for the unique manner in which they have been obtained. For
the Community is a quite unprecedented creation. It may be less than a federa-
tion, or even less than a confederation, but it represents a great deal more than a
traditional alliance or international organization. In establishing the Community
Member States have been ready to transfer important powers, although in a limi-
ted number of domains, to the Community institutions; they have done so not
just once but repeatedly and across a wide range of what has become Communi-
ty business. A new ~egal order has been created and common laws have been
extended over many fields of public administration. A major new entity - whose
standing is often rated far higher by its external partners than by its own mem~
bers - has taken its place on the world negotiating scene.
The elements of the Community's unique achievement may be traced in four
main fields. First, it is generally agreed that the greater part of the Treaties 
which seemed so ambitious when first drawn up - has now been implemented.The fundamental new creation is that of the common market for industrial and
agricultural products, labour, capital and services, which with its remaining im-
perfections still comes closer than ever before outside the confines of a single
State to establishing a homogeneous economic area with uniform conditions for
competition. The Community today has become one of the most important
single trade blocs in the world. The elaboration of a common competition policy
and a common trade policy constitutes, overall, a major work of construction.
The same applies to common policies as applied for example in the steel sector.
Secondly, the Six and then the nine Member States have managed to co-operate
in many ways not prescribed in detail in the Treaties. In some cases they built on
a Treaty provision to go further than the basic text would require: signature of
the Lome Convention, collaboration in international negotiations like the North-
South Dialogue, progressive extension of the capital and activities of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank. In other cases they have used Article 235 of the Treaty to
launch new policies and create new organs serving the general aims -of the Trea-
ty. Examples are the Regional Development Fund, the 'Ortoli' loan facility, the
first outlines of a common energy policy, a programme of aid to non-associated
developing countries. The European Monetary System is a major new creation
employing partly the framework of Community obligation and partly special me-
chanisms of its own. Finally there are the areas of co-operation developed wholly
outside the Treaty: the 'Political co-operation' which takes place in the field of
foreign affairs, or the discussions among the Nine on judicial and security ques-
tions.
A third very important achievement has been the preservation in very different
economic circumstances of what has already been created. In the 1970s the
Community found itself plunged into a major economic crisis, both external and
internal. It was trying simultaneously to absorb three new members and had no
common economic or monetary system on which to base a united front. Despite
all this, it managed to survive with its central policies and its political solidarity
intact, thus sparing its peoples all the consequences of a breakdown in European
trading relations.
Even in the area of institutional performance - whose inadequacies prompted
our mandate  there are some positive points to set against all the criticisms we
shall be making later. The institutions are dealing with a far greater and more
complex burden of business today than in the early years, and on the whole they
are getting the necessary work done. In the four years 1975 -1978 the Commis-
sion presented a total of .2798 legislative proposals to the Council and withdrew
212 proposals (a balance of 2586). The Council for its part adopted 2481 acts.
(Of the 431 earlier Commission proposals which were held up for want of a
Council decision on 1 February 1979, the great majority had been delayed or set
aside for reasons acknowledged by the Commission and only a handful weresubject to serious conflicts of view between the institutions.) The institutional
system itself has shown a capacity for fresh growth and innovation. Two amend-
ing Treaties have given the European Parliament further budgetary powers and
created a new organ of financial control, the Court of Auditors. Direct elections
to the Parliament have finally taken place. New forums for discussion and new
types of inter-institutional contact, like the conciliation procedure, have been
created.
Problems and Anxieties
Since the negative- side of the picture helped to inspire our appointment, it has
naturally loomed largest in the exchanges of view we have had with member
Governments. The problems they have mentioned, and the- underlying anxieties
we have detected, fall under very much the same headings as the four categories
of achievement mentioned above.
Many gaps remain in the implementation of the Treaties. There are major lacunae
in transport policy, free movement of capital and financial services and so forth.
These reflect the emergence of real practical and political obstacles which have
so far proved stronger than the best of intentions; but they still cause serious
concern in some quarters. Anxiety is even more widely spread, though for va-
rying reasons, about the 'hard core' of policies that have already been con-
structed on a Treaty base. Some States are now seriously dissatisfied with their
effects and operations, to the point sometimes of querying their basic rationale.
Others are distressed by precisely this tendency to criticize what they see as the
Community s most essential achievements.
This feeling of insecurity about the  acquis  has not been offset, but rather ag-
gravated, by the performance of the Community in new areas. All Governments
have confirmed that their co-operations is not limited to the letter of the Treaties.
Besides the explicit aims set out when they first came together, there are implicit
joint objectives demanding activity in ever newer fields. Some of these aims were
spelt out in considerable detail in the Summit declarations of 1972 and 1974. But
attempts to follow this up by the extension or further definition of Community
competences have made slow and painful progress. Some results have been ob-
tained, as mentioned above - some of them remarkably quickly. But these va-
rious initiatives have not, taken as a whole, fulfilled the intention of the original
declarations, nor have they cohered into one or more full-scale 'common poli-
cies . This failure to maintain the momentum of integration is deeply worrying.
The tendency to relapse into a static, narrow .interpretation of the Treaties can be
seen as a step towards the actual dismantling of the  acquis.The Community has survived the economic crisis, but it has been able to do very
little to combat it. Unemployment, inflation, problems of growth and balances of
payments have been constantly discussed in Community forums over recent
years. Yet the action taken through Community instruments in this field has been
extremely limited. There has been no real overall co-ordination of States' eco~
nomic, financial and monetary policies. The challenges of the 1970s did not, as
might have been expected, furnish a new incentive for progress in this field: in-
stead, States have sought to protect their own industries by special measures
which have made the conditions more difficult, not only for the harmonization of
economic policies, but for the functioning of the common market itself. A new
start is being made now with the European Monetary System. This is an experi-
ment of real significance in both substantive and procedural terms.
On the institutional front, the main complaint is not that the work is not getting
done. The problem is the disproportionate effort, in terms of energy, time and
money, that seems to be needed to produce even a rather modest output. Apart
from the waste involved, the cumbersomeness of the process itself discourages
higher productivity. The participants have little time to stand back and examine
the justification for and operational efficiency of their proceedings, let alone to
discuss the more general directions in which they should be striving.
These problems are exposed most sharply in the Council, as the centre of Com-
munity decision-taking. There are three or four times as many Council meetings
now as there were in 1958 and the lower levels of the Council machinery have
ramified even faster. Yet the significance of the business concluded has not in-
creased in proportion to the volume. Many would say it has declined. Partly a
contributory cause and partly an effect of this is the declining authority of the
Commission. Within both these institutions and in the web of interinstitutional
relations that surrounds them there is a trend to fragmentation and loss of cen-
tral control. While specialized Councils and working groups have multiplied, the
General' Council of Foreign Ministers1 has failed to live up to its traditional task
of overall co-ordination. The 13-man Commission has not developed a coherent
overall vision of its own which could help to give proportion and direction to the
large number of its proposals. This general phenomenon of an excessive load of
business aggravated by slow and confused handling may be summed up in the
one French word  lourdeur,  which will be used as a kind of shorthand elsewhere in
this report.
Naturally these problems have not gone unnoticed. One major practical step has
been taken in response: the establishment of the European Council as a regular
1 That formation of the Council of the European Communities which is attended by Foreign Ministers
can be variously described as the Foreign Affairs Council, the General Affairs Council, the Council of
Foreign Ministers and so on. These expressions will be used interchangeably in this Report depending
on the context.thrice-yearly event. Heads of State and Government created this special forum as
an escape from the bureaucracy weighing down the other institutions, in order
to provide leadership and guidance. They succeeded in this to .a remarkable ex-
tent, generating and implementing a number of valuable initiatives. But the philo-
sophical uncertainties and practical problems associated with the creation of the
European Council have not yet been wholly laid to rest and its relations with the
Treaty institutions  including the Parliament - have yet to be properly defined.
The existence of the European Council also contributes to wider concerns about
the way in which the Community handles its business today. The increasing va-
riety of forums and procedures mentioned earlier means that Member States
more often reach their agreements by methods which depart from Treaty rules
ancl frolT' The traditional framework of Community competence. No clear view
has emprged of precisely how these methods will fit in with any model of i.ntegra~'
tion. The lack of consensus about the proper uses of Treaty and non-Treaty me-
thods is made more serious by the smaller States' concern that any departure
from Treaty norms may upset the institutional balance and erode their own rights
vis-a-vis  their larger partners.
The Causes
In seeking the causes of these shortcomings, in both policies and procedures, we
have not been looking for scapegoats. It would be both irresponsible and de-
featist to blame everything on the deliberate ill-will of nations or individuals. Our
objective is to identify the historical and material factors of which we have all in
some sense been the victims.
The first and most important factor is the profound transformation in the econo-
mic and political environment of Western Europe in the last ten years. The period
of the 'construction of Europe' in the sixties was a time of sustained growth and
relative monetary stability. The Governments of the day were sure enough of
their authority to take a gamble or to make a sacrifice for the common good.
Since 1970 the pendulum has swung back to inflation and lagging growth, ac-
companied by severe monetary disturbances. Among the countries which make
up the Community, defensive reactions, reluctance to experiment and the jealous
guarding of scarce resources were only to be expected. Economic and social ad-
versity have, moreover, tended in some countries to weaken the authority of the
Governments themselves and to reduce their room for manoeuvre  precisely at
a time when increasing Government intervention in national economies has made
the latter more dependent on political will and political possibilities. The remark-
able thing in these circumstances is not that the tempo of European construction
has slowed down, but that the nine Member States have managed to preservetheir solidarity at all and that the more obvious temptations to protectionism
have been avoided.
Even with a more favourable economic background, the Community of the 70s
could not have escaped two further types of difficulty: those created by the na-
ture of the subject-matter, and those created by membership.
The subject-matter of Community activity has multiplied and become more com-
plex since the early days  not least because of the successes of the period of
construction. The  acquis  created then has to be administered, preserved, fur-
ther adjusted in the light of current demands or criticisms; when new tasks and
policies arise, genuinely new resources must be found to cope with them. The
three new members of 1973 brought new ideas of their own and new themes
they wanted to pursue. The evolution of the institutional system itself increased
the range of business. For instance Ministers now spend far more time communi-
cating with the European Parliament, and in far more different ways, than in the
time of the founding fathers. Finally, although the expansion of political co-ope-
ration and other consultations among the Nine has not increased the load on the
Community institutions as such, it has widened the range of tasks between
which the Member Governments must allocate resources, particularly while hold-
ing the Presidency.
The new areas of activity now being developed present special problems of their
own. The issues to be tackled are ones for which, for the most part, no detailed
guidelines can be found within the Treaties, so that no agreed definition of Com-
munity Gompetences in a particular field exists at the outset. To establish precise-
ly what the Community should be doing, and what precise role each institution
should play in the process, becomes a heavy labour giving plentiful opportunities
for dispute. In some cases Member States have not even seriously embarked on
the work of definition.
To mention membership as the second major administrative problem is not to call
in question the validity of the first enlargement. The accessions of 1973 reflected
a political decision taken by all concerned on their own responsibility and 
with the second enlargement - those who willed the act must also will the con-
sequences. But apart from the operational difficulties caused by the simple in-
crease in numbers, the special interests of the newcomers were such as to in~
crease the difficulty of agreement on certain key issues such as food prices
fisheries and energy.
How have the institutions themselves reacted to these problems: the hostile envi-
ronment, the proliferating subject-matter and number of participants? The verdict
must be that, in spite of many useful studies and efforts for reform, they have all
too often added to instead of easing the difficulties. The rational response to agrowing burden  concentration of resources, co-ordination, division of labour
has not always been clearly perceived, and where perceived has not always
been consistently implemented. In their own machinery as wen as in their hand~
ling of policy problems, the institutions have been prone to a certain confusion
and diffusion of effort. Bureaucratic behaviour, in several areas, has gratuitously
aggravated the deeper sources of  lourdeur.
Scope for Institutional Recommendations
This analysis should, speak for itself as to the assumptions on which we have to
base our report. It may well be as well, however, to spell out quite clearly at this
point what ground we believe we can and cannot cover in our recommendations.
The best institutional system in the world could not have saved the Community
of Nine (or one of Six) from the economic crisis of the 70s. No- reforms we may
suggest now can make unemployment, lagging growth, inflation and the political
problems to which they give rise disappear. Yet these are the most fatal obstac-
les to the 'proper operation' of the Communities today.
What, then, can we hope to achieve by adaptations to the machinery and proce-
dures? The only problem we can really tackle by such means is the fourth of
those mentioned above: the extra handicaps imposed by inefficiency and disper-
sion of effort within the machinery itself. The aim we have set ourselves is to en-
sure that the institutions and their procedures, instead of aggravating the existing
difficulties, create the best possible administrative conditions for overcoming
them. In general terms this means ensuring that the priority issues are clearly
singled out; that the responsibilities and resources for dealing with them are allo-
cated in a specific and coherent manner; and that results are achieved with the
maximum economy of effort. In choosing c:riteria of this sort, we have set aside
the possibility of constructing an ideal, philosophically consistent 'model' of a
Community constitution. Such a model may have been relevant in the past and
may be so again in the future, but it is not a recipe for helping the Community
machine to work better here and now. The adjustments which we shall suggest
for that purpose are purely practical and on the whole quite limited in scope. The
problem is often not to find good new ideas, but to ensure that good old ones
are put into practice.II. The European Council
Introductory Remarks on the Institutions
It is no part of our task to propose altering the balance of institutional powers as
it stands today. We take reality as our starting-point and our aim is to make
every  institution operate as effectively as possible in its present-day role. The re-
lations between institutions are, however, a vital part of this picture. All the or-
gans of the Community are inter-dependent - the triangular process of legis la-
tion through Commission proposal, Parliamentary consultation and Council
enactment being the classic example - and each institution relies for its daily
functioning on the contributions made by others. For each institution, then, good
and balanced relations with other bodies are a pre-condition of efficiency.
In this chapter, and in the four that follow it, we shall be examining each or'Jan
separately and focusing on its own internal and external problems. But our pro-
posals are based on a conception of the institutions, not as separately acting
bodies, but in all their complex relations of inter-action and inter-dependence. It
follows that the adjustments we suggest will bear most fruit if each institution
uses what greater efficiency it achieves for working in harmony with the other
bodies. A certain level of tension and rivalry is natural in every great organization
and is indeed a condition for progress. There will he clashes from time to time.
The risk of their producing effects which are ultimately more destructive than
constructive will be avoided only if all the institutions involved work in the inter-
ests of Europe as a whole; and if objectives are sought and found on which all
institutions, and all States, can work together.
The European Council: Background
The European Council has existed under that name for less than five years. It is
now agreed that it has become indispensable in the overall operation of the
Community. It illustrates the Community s capacity for self-renewal in difficult
circumstances.The European Council was created to meet the demands of a period in which the
detailed guidance in the Treaties was running out, external circumstances had
grown hostile, and the capacity to tackle these problems both of the Council of
Ministers and of the Commission had declined. As the Community legal order ex-
tended into more and more branches of national administration, Foreign Minis-
ters had ceased to have exclusive responsibility for their States' European poli-
cies. Specialist Ministers had developed considerable competence and interests
of their own in their respective sectors of Community action  interests which
were sometimes potentially in conflict. It was logical that the leaders of the Nine
Governments, who could take the overall view and speak for all their colleagues
to a greater extent than any individual Minister, should decide to create a foru~
in which they themselves could deliberate on Community affairs.
The first meetings of Heads of State and Government took place at irregular
intervals and ware known as Summits. The 'constitution' of the European Coun-
cil as we know it today was not laid down until the Paris Summit of December
1974. On that occasion it was announced that Heads of Government would meet
three times a year and whenever necessary, 'in the Council of the Communities
and in the context of political co-operation . The Heads of Government would be
accompanied only by their Foreign Ministers: attendance would be limited as
~ ,-
strictly asina national 'Cabinet'
. ."
Since that time the European Council has met regularly thrice a year, and it can
look back on significant achievements. Within the Community framework it has
resolved a series of contentious issues posing grave threats to solidarity and pro-
gress. It has launched valuable new ventures. It has taken a stand on major
world issues. Without the European Council these results would have been ob-
tained far more slowly and painfully or not at all. Its right to exist is, then, no lon-
ger challenged.
Yet the launching of regular European Council meetings was accompanied on
several sides by fears and by uncertainties. Its existence was thought to call 
doubt Community legality, the rights of smaller States and of Treaty institutions;
its procedures had to be built up from scratch. Five years is a short time for any
new organ to integrate itself into so complex a structure as the European Com-
munity, and in some respects the European Council is perceived even now as a
foreign body . The philosophical concerns surrounding it have not been wholly
forgotten. Some of the ground gained in defining its procedures, by an informal
agreement among Member States in early 1977, has been lost again by inconsis~
tencies in application. Its relations with the Treaty institutions have, yet to 
regularized and developed to their full potential.
In this chapter we shall aim to describe the European Council's role and func-
tions; to define the general principles on which the effective exercise of its roledepends; to consider how its guiding role can develop further; and finally, to re-
view some specific problems in its functioning.
Role and Functions of the European Council
The European Council has three characteristic functions which it alone can per-
form. It can provide a forum for free and informal exchanges of view between
the heads of the Nine Member States. It can deliberate at the same time on mat-
ters of Treaty competence, questions of political co-operation, and common con..
cerns which do not yet belong to any framework of obligation. It can generate
overall impetus, mobilizing the Community s resources for progress. The fourth
task it undertakes  acting as a court of appeal on dossiers referred up from be-
low  is less distinctive, being merely an extension of the Council of Ministers
work, and Heads of Government should be aware of the need not to let it domi-
nate their agendas.
The informal exchanges of view among Heads of Government are held in the
greatest privacy and are not designed to lead to decisions or public statements.
The discussions which are designed to produce decisions settle guidelines for
future action or lead to the issue of agreed public statements may produce three
procedurally distinct, types of results:
guidelines and general directions;
decisions on matters of political co-operation;
--- specific decisions on a matter of Community concern and competence.
From the point of view of Community jurisprudence the European Council is
therefore, a hybrid organ. But the precise relationship of its activities to the Com-
munity rules and Treaties has become better defined and understood with the
passage of time and working principles have emerged which it is no part of our
intention to question or change. Thus, when the European Council follows the
first of the three paths above  issuing general guidelines and directions on mat-
ters of Community competence  it is clearly acting within the Community
framework and creating important political commitments in that context. It must
therefore take account of Community procedures but it is not taking decisions
with legal force in the sense of the Treaties. It is left to another body, usually the
Council of Ministers, to give legal force to the European Council's wishes by tak-
ing appropriate legislative and executive measures.
When the European Council acts under the second head its deliberations and de-
cisions have no relation to the Treaties since political co-operation as a whole lies
outside the latter.In the third hypothesis, when the European Council takes a specific decision pur-
porting to be legally binding, it can be regarded under Article 2 of the Merger
Treaty as a special formation of the Council of Ministers wielding the normal leg-
islative authority of the latter. It is obliged to observe all the appropriate Treaty
rules applying to a Council decision  Commission proposal, publication in the
Official Journal etc. There has, in fact, been no recorded instance so far of the
European Council acting in this way and it is hard to see the case arising very of-
ten in practice.
The Effective Exercise of the European Council's Role: General Principles
The European Council was set up to escape from the 
lourdeur  afflicting the tradi-
tional Community bodies. It succeeded in this and restored political impetus and
spontaneity to the handling of Community affairs at the highest level, because its
own procedures were made as 'light' and informal as possible. The prime re-
quirement for its continued good functioning is to preserve this procedural sim-
plicity and flexibility. Only in this way can it fulfil its role as described above 
i.e. to offer something different from and more than any ordinary Council of Min-
isters.
On the other hand, the European Council cannot operate in complete freedom
because the greater part of its conclusions depend on other bodies for their ex-
ecution. Its meetings are few and short and the subject-matter often very com-
plex: they therefore need careful preparation. These practical considerationsim-
pose a certain discipline and certain minimum organizational requirements. The
key problem with the European Council is to find the right balance between free-
dom and discipline, so that the organ can continue to generate impetus, but also
transmit it effectively to the rest of the machinery.
This balance is also important as a way of defending smaller States and Treaty
institutions against encroachment on their rights. It is hard to guarantee that the
European Council itself will not operate at times on a balance of national and in-
stitutional powers differing from that in the Treaties. But if the right links are
maintained between it and the Treaty institutions which prepare and follow up its
work, checks and balances will be available to ensure that the Community struc~
tore as a whole is not prejudiced.
The European Council's Guiding Role: a Priority Plan
The proper relationship between the European Council and the Treaty institutions
can be deduced from the second principle above. The European Council should
not erode the competences of these institutions. It should help them work better
by giving encouragement, coherence and an overall direction to their efforts.The European Council has not yet realized its full potential in this guiding role.
Yet the need for its. leadership will be stronger than ever in the next few years.
The Community is approaching a point  because of the structure of its finan~
cial resources - where conscious decisions must be taken on the scale of and
priorities for its spending in future. A consensus must be established on the main
lines of policy development, to show the way where the detailed guidance of the
Treaties no longer applies.
We propose that the European Council should work out an explicit scheme of
priorities for Community action  in the next few years, which it can adopt before
the end of 1980.1 This scheme should cover all the main tasks for the period in
question: not only new ventures but also the maintenance and (where necessary)
adaptation of the  acquis.  The list must be precise and practical, a declaration of
intent rather than a pious hope. It should indicate not only aims but the immediate
paths which should be followed to attain them, and the broad lines on which re-
sponsibility should be allocated for their execution. The list will not De fixed or
exhaustive, and the European Council should review it as often as it thinks nec-
essary  say, not less than once a year. In this way, the priorities can develop
into a kind of permanently available 'master plan , against which specific propo-
sals can be measured and in the light of which short-term decisions can be
taken.
The Commission must collaborate closeJy in producing the plan of priorities, and
could appropriately produce a first draft for Heads of Governments' considera-
tion. Parliament should be given an opportunity to debate the plan at some
stage. Once adopted, it should be used as a framework for the shorter-term pol-
icy and operational plans which we believe each institution should draw up on its
own account. The six-month programme of the Council Presidency, discussed in
the 'Council' chapter below, must be closely based on the European Council'
priorities. The Commission should also take account of them in preparing its own
policy programme, although it will develop its own ideas on the proposals need-
ed to achieve agreed goals.
Working Relations with the Council and Commission
However much it may need the European Council's guidance , the  Council of
Ministers  should not be reduced to a less political role. It plays a role in prepara-
tion and execution without which the European Council itself cannot operate. If
it is to leave Heads of Government free to do what they do best, it must conti-
nue to resolve on its own authority all but the most intractable political dossiers.
1 See also our chapter on 'Enlargement'.
2 See 'Commission' chapter below.
3 On the Council/European Council relationship see also the ' Council' chapter below.The European Council was at first seen by some as a threat to the  Commission.
By launching new policies it seemed to usurp the latter s right of initiative, and
where it resorted to non-Treaty methods it might hamper the Commission in its
role as guardian of Community legality. In fact the Commission seems content
today both with the existence of the European Council  given its undeniable
achievements - and with its own participation in its meetings. In these new sur-
roundings, it is finding new ways to play its traditional role.
The relationship between European Council and Commission has, then, beensta-
bilized over the years. But the Commission has only gradually evolved the right
format for its input into European Council discussions, and its papers have some-
times lost impact by the simple fact of arriving too late. There is need for more
regular and punctual presentation of Commission documents. The authority with
which the Commission s President speaks in European Council deliberations
could also be further enhanced. One valuable contribution to achieving this
would be a strengthening of the President'
s authority  within  the Commission. He
cannot be a valid interlocutor for Heads of Government unless he can mobilize
the whole Commission to follow up agreed objectives. This problem is dealt with
further in our 'Commission' chapter.
The European Parliament
So far the European Parliament's only information on the activities of the Euro-
pean Council has come from a report made by the Presidency Foreign Minister
after each European Council meeting. It had no direct contact with Heads of
Government until the Irish Prime Minister, with his colleagues' endorsement , at-
tended the inaugural session of the directly-elected Parliament at Strasbourg this
July.
Given the European Council's present role in the fortunes of the Community, it is
not right that this obvious gap in its relations with the Treaty institutions should
persist. We propose that the President of the European Council should attend
the Parliament in person 1 once in each Presidency. The Foreign Minister can
continue to report on the third annual meeting as before. The aim should be to
give the Parliament a clear idea of what conclusions Heads of Government have
reached and why, and to discuss how other institutions might contribute to the
tasks in hand. The Parliament will express its views in the ensuing debate and
the European Council should take due note of them. Indeed, in all its work in the
Community sphere the European Council should be more alive to Parliament'
rights and interests. It is up to the Presidency as well as the Commission to bring
such factors firmly to the attention of Heads of Government. Only thus can the
1 Consideration must be given to the special position of the President of the French Republic.relations between European Council and European Parliament be placed on a fir-
mer footing of trust and co-operation.
Specific Operational Questions
Frequency of A4eeungs
No rigid rule on the number of European Council meetings was laid down 
1974. The possibility is open for Heads of Government to meet more often 
and presumably also less often - than three times a year depending on the bur-
den of business. The number of meetings for a given year should be decided af-
ter conscious reflection, in the light of actual operational needs, at the time when
the advance plans are settled.
The Agenda
The quality of the European Council's work depends on limiting the quantity:
Heads of Government should be asked to spend time only on matters where they
have a clear and characteristic contribution to offer. In practice, discussion at
most European Council meetings is focussed on a few issues agreed by all to be
paramount, but an effort should be made to identify these issues as clearly
as possible at every stage of preparation. If Heads of Government are, neverthe-
less, presented with an overcrowded agenda the remedy lies with themselves.
They should be free  not  to discuss a subject which they consider undeserving of
their attention, ill-defined or insufficiently prepared. If they make resolute use of
this possibility, none of them should ever need to complain of having been
bounced' .
Preparation of A4eetings
The agreement on European Council procedures reached in 1977 distinguished
between different types of work and the different preparations which they requi-
red. Such distinctions are fully justified and there can be no single, rigid route for
preparation. The 'fireside chats' need hardly any advance work at all except brief
notification of the subjects. Where guidance is expected from the European
Council, some input from the Community or PoCo machinery as appropriate is
required; and if a declaration or resolution is to be issued the text needs to be
drafted and agreed so far as possible in advance. These preparations may require
input from several parts of the Community machine. Specialized Councils have
naturally taken on the substantive burden of preparation for European Council
actions in their own fields.This flexibility and diversity in preparation should remain. At times further ele-
ments may usefully be added, such as  ad hoc  meetings of high officials to work
on a specific item not ' processed' by the regular machinery.
However overall supervision  is also necessary if confusion is to be avoided and
any relevant Treaty provisions are not to be overlooked. There must be a single
point at which the whole agenda can be reviewed, a reasonable time in advance.
Thus States can satisfy themselves that they understand the status and purpose
of each item and that preparation, whatever the route used, has been adequate.
In 1977 Heads of Government asked  Foreign Ministers  to take on this overall re-
sponsibility, and the logic of this is clear. Foreign Ministers are the only Ministers
who attend the European Council. They are informed on both Community and
political co-operation affairs and have special competence for institutional ques-
tions. They have a ready-made source of help in their preparatory work in the
shape of COREPER. Over the years, therefore, it has become estCiblished practice
for the Foreign Affairs Council to meet shortly before the European Council, with
preparation for the latter as an item on its agenda. The contributions from other
Councils are organized so far as possible to allow a complete review of the agen-
da at this stage. COREPER in turn prepares the Foreign Ministers' discussion,
and is the forum in which the first draft agenda is normally circulated.
We see no need to change this arrangement. It should be reaffirmed and more
consistently applied. The most important condition for making it work well is dis-
cipline on timing. The aim should be to circulate the first draft agenda three
weeks in advance of the European Council meeting. The rule laid down in 1977
that any draft declarations should be circulated at least two or three weeks in ad-
vance must be respected. Two weeks should be the minimum for circulation 
discussion documents, including those provided by the Commission. Such pap-
ers must be available in all the Community s official languages.
Attendance
The European Council's 'Cabinet'-like nature has been successfully preserved so
far. Attendance is limited to Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers, the Presi-
dent of the Commission plus one Vice-President, and a couple of observers each
from the Council Secretariat and the Presidency who are understood to have re-
cording duties. These arrangements are essential for the proper functioning 
the European Council and should be strictly observed. The only change we con-
template is the admission of the junior Minister, if any, charged with a share in
Presidency duties (see 'Council' chapter below). There is of course nothing to
stop groups of officials, or Ministers, meeting concurrently to do a .specific job
for Heads of Government while the European Council session is in progress, and
such separate meetings are now quite frequent. But they risk creating confusionand overlap: the Presidency should aim to keep parallel sessions to a minimum
and to define their purpose and mandate so clearly as to rule out duplications of
effort.
Follow-up
In the past, the European Council has sometimes been accused of reaching
conclusions which are over-vague and offer no firm basis for follow-up. States
have sometimes disagreed subsequently about the wording of the conclusions
and what they imply. One suggestion made to deal with this problem is that a
special secretariat should be set up for the European Council, so that conclusions
can be recorded in a precise and neutral way.
As mentioned above, both the Council Secretariat and the Presidency take note
during plenary sessions (the 'fireside chat' is not recorded). At an early.stage in
the proceedings the Presidency circulates a draft set of conclusions which are re-
viewed both by officials and by Heads of Government themselves before being
adopted on the Presidency s own authority at the end of the meeting. Any detail-
ed texts agreed during sessions are inserted as they stand. We are not convinced
of the need to change this system or to set up a secretariat. The European Coun~
cilacts and reaches conclusions in several different ways: to impose a fixed sys-
tem of recording would risk bureaucratizing and standardizing the proceedings to
a point where all freshness and flexibility was lost. But if the present arrange-
ment is to remain, the Presidency must realize what a heavy responsibility its
last word' on the conclusions implies. If the final version it produces isimpre-
cise or fails to correspond to understandings reached in discussion, Member Sta-
tes will not co-operate in follow-up and the desired results will simply not be at~
tained. To help it achieve the necessary accuracy and impartiality, the Presidency
should collaborate with the Council Secretariat, which for its part must live up to
this important task.
For the organization of Follow-up, the inverse of the preparatory arrangements
applies. The Presidency conclusions are laid before Foreign Ministers, who satisfy
themselves that all the action required has been set in hand by the appropriate
bodies. It will help if the European Council itself makes clear who its requests are
addressed to. This part of the system has generally worked well and does not
need to be changed.
The Presidency of the European COI.,mcii
The idea has been put forward of establishing a longer-term Presidency of the
European Council. If the present system of rotation is retained in the enlargedCommunity, each Head of State or Government will preside at one ~ or at best
two ~ sessions of the European Council every six years.
It is to avoid such frequent changes that this idea has been advanced. The Euro-
pean Council's structure, unlike that of the Council  of Ministers, is not defined in
the Treaty. The Council of Ministers holds many meetings during the six-month
Presidency period and is not confronted with the same problem. A change in the
Presidency of the European Council would not affect the rotation of the Presi-
dency of the Council of Ministers.
On this hypothesis the President of the European Council, instead of changing
every six months, might be designated for a longer period ~ for instance one or
two years - by the members of the European Council. Certain rules of alterna-
tion would need to be applied, but there would be greater continuity notably in
dealings with the outside world.
We have looked at this idea carefully, and it seems to us that it would present
real difficulties in the present state of the Community.
In any .event, a certain continuity in the handling of business could be achieved
here and now if the President-in-Office asked one or more of his colleagues to
take on a particular dossier, under the President's own authority. Below we shall
offer the same proposal for the Council of Ministers and its subordinate organs.
This sharing of burdens should be an option for the Presidency to use with .great
flexibility and at its own initiative.
Recapitulation
We believe that good solutions to most of the purely operational problems of the
European Council have been found already. We have contented ourselves with
reaffirming, and in modest ways reinforcing, the practices we believe essential to
preserve the balance between freedom and discipline in European Council pro-
ceedings: limited agendas, limited attendance, coherent preparation and follow-
up, early circulation of documents, Presidency responsibility for conclusions and
so on. It is in the European Council's relations with the other, Treaty institutions
that we have found most scope and most need for improvement. Our specific
suggestions  preserving a due role for the Council, strengthening the Commis-
sion in its collaboration with Heads of Government, establishing direct relations
between the European Council and Parliament ~ .are designed to integrate the
European Council so far as possible within the normal framework of inter-institu-
tional relations, with all the safeguards that implies. In proposing that the Euro-
pean Council adopt before 1981 a 'master plan' of priorities - making provision
both for advance consultation with, and for follow-up by, the institutions - wehave aimed to harness the European Council's full potential for political leader-
ship, so that the whole Community machine may be impelled and guided in the
most fruitful directions for progress.
The Choice of Procedures
Because of its hybrid nature  covering both Community and political co-opera~
tion matters and other possible forms of co-operation - the European Council is
the point at which the problem of choice of working methods, in new policy
areas in particular, arises in its most immediate form.
Experience has shown that when the Community, with its increased number of
members, tries to make rapid progress in a new direction, the strict procedural
rules that apply to actions undertaken within the Treaty may act as a dis1ncentive
for some participants and a stumbling-block for all. The subject-matter is 'often
difficult to fit into the familiar legal framework of earlier common policies and it
may be hard to find specific Treaty provisions that provide indisputable authority
and a legal base for Community action as such. Some States are reluctant to ac-
cept binding legal obligations in the early stages of collaboration. It has been said
to us that this reluctance can be reinforced by the consideration that any Com-
munity legislation in a new sphere may be construed as giving the Community
exclusive external competence in that area.
The solution often put forward  use of unorthodox methods and procedures
falling short of formal Treaty commitments  needs to be approached with real-
ism and with extreme caution. We have mentioned the widely-felt concern that
the spread of weaker forms of commitment could undermine the force of exist-
ing common policies, of the Community institutions and ultimately of the Treaty
itself. There are more immediate practical problems as well. The careless prolifer-
ation of new procedures and types of engagement adds new branches to the
machinery, increases the complexity of relations between Member States and
thus multiplies the risks of confusion and  lourdeur.  It also increases the difficulty
of taking a clear overall view of the range of common activity, and makes it hard
to guarantee that links between the various fields will be spotted and work in
them harmonized accordingly.
It should be possible, taking account of past experience, to define a role for
non-Treaty methods in the enlarged Community that acknowledges their occa-
sional usefulness while avoiding the perils of proliferation. We suggest the fol-
lowing three-point approach.
First, the question of the choice of methods in a new sector must always be set-
tled bya clear and conscious decision after consideration of all the factors. In thisconsideration, priority must be given to the possibility of acting under Article 235
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. This Article solves
the problem of a legal base by empowering the Council to take appropriate
measures to establish policies in areas where they are ' necessary to attain...
one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers . Only if the route of normal Community legislation under this
Article (which requires unanimity) is clearly impossible, and if the action in ques-
tion can nevertheless contribute to progress in the Community, should other less
traditional methods be contemplated. In these circumstances no solution should
be  prima facie  excluded which allows Member States to agree on actions in
common.
Secondly, when non-Treaty methods and obligations are adopted, they must not
be pursued in isolation from Community affairs in the narrower sense. The Euro-
pean Council is uniquely placed to survey the whole spread of Treaty and non-
Treaty co-operation, and Heads of Government  together with the Commission
should keep watch on the development of the various types of activity and
exercise a co-ordinating influence as necessary. When, for instance, efforts made
in the different frameworks seem to be pulling in contrary directions the Euro-
pean Council should reassert the primary policy objective which all concerned
must respect. This co-ordination can be particularly valuable when applied be~
tween Community policies and actions taken in political co-operation. Member
States often have both economic and political interests in common in a given ex-
ternal issue, and the two types of joint action corresponding to these interests
can fruitfully reinforce each other. For maximum effectiveness, a certain flexibility
in the joint handling of PoCo and Community considerations should continue to
be tolerated below the European Council level as well.
Thirdly, where non-Treaty methods are used it should be clear (except in the case
of political co-operation) that they represent a provisional solution, a first phase
in the procedures of co-operation. Generally it will be possible to move on at a
later stage to the formulation of Treaty obligations which might take the form of
the consolidation of several separate efforts in a single common policy. However
long it takes, this trend of movement from outside to inside the Treaty should be
the normal one.III. The Council of Ministers
The Community Council of Ministers has a dual nature. As an institution of the
Communities it has to fulfil the duties entrusted to it in the Treaties, derives its
powers exclusively from the Treaties and has to exercise them according to the
procedures laid down therein. On the other hand the Council is, in a significant
sense, inter-governmental. It is composed of members of the Governments of
Member States. The two phases of Council activity which correspond to this
dual nature - the harmonization of national views and interests among its mem-
bers and the collective legislative decisions which follow  should ideally form
part of a single constructive process.
If the Council has not always worked as harmoniously and as productively as this
implies, the fault may lie partly with the particular accumulation of burdens it has
been made to bear. The sheer amount of business that a nine-man body not in
permanent session can cope with is limited, and the output and the whole pace
of Community development is bound to be limited in consequence. There has al-
so been a growing tendency to dislocate the two phases of the Council's opera-
tion. Far more energy and ingenuity has been expended on the process of nego-
tiation within the Council and the sense of collective responsibility for producing
useful results has declined. The mood of the negotiation itself has become nar-
rowly national, and hence more inter-governmental in character. These are symp-
toms of the general evolution in States' attitudes that has weakened the stand-
ing of the more Isupranational' institutions and increased the significance of the
Council relative to the Commission within the Community machine.
The Problems
This increased significance has not, however, gone hand in hand with improved
performance. The general problem - the excess of effort expended in the Coun-
cil and its subordinate bodies, and the insufficiency of the results  has been
mentioned already. It needs to be analysed in rather more detail here.
The failings of the Council may be identified under four main heads.Firstly, the sheer burden of business has become unmanageable, and the way in
which it is handled has not helped. Agendas are over-crowded and badly orga-
nized, making no regular distinction between major items and minor ones. The
agreed rules on preparation and procedure are constantly disregarded, causing
more waste and misdirection of effort. The Presidency, which should take res-
ponsibility for imposing discipline in these matters and more generally for guid-
ing the Council towards early and valid results, has itself suffered all too often
from lack of discipline and of coherence. The strong, objective but politically sen-
sitive control from the centre which the rotating Presidency was meant to
guarantee has not been achieved with any regularity; complaints of political bias
and administrative inadequacy have .alternated and sometimes been combined. It
is sometimes argued that the power of .a bad Presidency to harm the Community
is strictly limited, and this may be true so far as damage from sins of commission
is concerned. But the real sins of such a Presidency are sins of omission. It fails
to provide a coherent working pattern, to inspire the numerous bodies it chairs
with a clear understanding of their tasks. It fails to impose disCipline in discus-
sion, to focus on the real obstacles and exert pressure for solutions. It fails to as-
sert a sense of realism and proportion and to expose States which are holding up
business for inadequate reasons. The disappointing results have spoken for
themselves.
Secondly, the Council's position as the main seat of authority in the vertical hier-
archy is being eroded. It has surrendered many major decisions  apparently by
its own will rather than that of the Heads of Government - upwards to the Euro-
pean Council. It is less often appreciated how far the Council's overall responsibil-
ity for decision-making has been compromised by its failure to assert control over
low-level working groups. As we shall argue, it is right that much of the technical
processing' of proposals should be delegated to such bodies, to assist the Council
in taking its eventual decisions. But too many working groups today seem to have
become autonomous negotiating forums, where quite junior national officials can
block progress by appealing to 'political' obstacles which their political masters
might well fail to acknowledge. The deficiencies of a weak or incoherent Presiden-
cy are magnified at these lower levels, and dossiers may languish there aimlessly
for years without Ministers ever having a chance to consider their merits.
Thirdly, there is a problem affecting mainly the Foreign Affairs Council: the loss
of collegiate sense arising from irregular attendance. Ministers, if they come 
all, may fly in for only part of a session, and those arriving at the beginning can
never be sure who they are going to meet and negotiate with. The number of of-
ficials present has not been controlled on any consistent rational principle. It is
symptomatic that Foreign Ministers have had to arrange regular 'informal' meet-
ings where they actually have some chance of talking to each other: these meet-
ings can perhaps ease, but cannot ever take over, the legislative duties of the
Council proper.Fourthly, the Council structure has suffered a kind of horizontal disintegration as
Community business has diverged into a number of separate sectors with a high-
ly-detailed subject-matter and procedural traditions of their own. Specialized
Council meetings have multiplied, and under them special preparatory commit..
tees of officials have appeared which either duplicate or detract from the original
functions of COREPER. No strong co-ordinating force has emerged .at Council
level to counteract these tendencies. The 'General' Council of Foreign Ministers
has ceased to be General either in the sense of directing the work of the separ-
ate Councils, orin the sense of providing a forum for the discussion of all major
new issues. It retains at least three important functions of its own. It acts as a
specialized' Council for institutional questions and external affairs; it offers a 'po-
litical' forum where certain technical matters of high political sensitivity can be
discussed (e.g. nuclear energy); and it takes decisions in a number of sectors
where it has been decided not to convene a separate formation of the Council
(steel, textiles). But it cannot hope to direct the work of, still less dictate to
other formations like the Agriculture and Finance Councils. Devices like joint
Councils1 and Marlia Reports2 have not turned the course of this evolution. The
resolution of conflicts among the major formations of the Council can nowadays
be attempted only at European Council level. 
Proposals for Improvement
Our .approach to the problems of the Council can be stated quite simply. It is not
the balance of institutional powers which needs to be changed, even if it could
be. That balance today incorporates the European Council, a body above the
CouncIl of Ministers whi.ch necessarIly modifies the latter s role. Certain tasks
which belonged to the Council at the outset of the Community can, therefore,
never be exercised in quite the same way ,again. But the duties which it retains
are still indispensable for progress in the Col'(lmunity. To deal with them no new
organizational solutions or management techniques are needed beyond those
which have been invented in the course of the Community s evolution, and to
which States have often explicitly committed themselves. The real task is to get
these procedures enforced, and to make the structures operate to the full extent
of their capacity. This cannot be achieved without the  clearer definition, and the
consistently more efficient execution, of responsibilities for the management of
business.
1 Joint Councils of Foreign and Agriculture, or Finance and Agriculture, Ministers have been held in the
past and Joint Councils of Foreign and Finance Ministers to discuss budgetary priorities .are currently
an annual event.
2 The 'Marlia' procedure involves the presentation to the General Affairs Council, by the Presidency, of
a report on progress made and problems outstanding in other formations of the Council which can
serve as a basis for debating the latter.The Role of the Presidency
In improving the Council's performance, the first priority is to strengthen the Pre-
sidency in its dual role of organizational control and political impetus. It is no ac-
cident that the functions of the Presidency have been both expanded and more
widely recognized in recent years. The strong central management which it can
provide offers the most natural means of compensating" for the centrifugal ten-
dencies within the Council. It bears the prime responsibility for tackling the
spread of specialized business, the ramifying inter-institutional relations, the dif-
fering interests and behaviour of Member States. The virtual breakdown in Coun-
cil work under some particularly  bad'  Presidencies (whether their faults lay 
weakness, or an over-autocratic approach, or both) has shown that if the Presi-
dency does not do this job, there is no longer anyone else who can fill the
breach.
How can the Presidency s functioning be improved, and made more consistent?
The first step must be to recognize that the State holding the Chair has certain
fixed responsibilities  for the management of Council business and the good
working of the Community as a whole, and that its prior commitment is to car-
rying these out.
The second step is to ensure that the Presidency has the  authority  to impose
good order and discipline in the work of the Council and its subordinate bodies.
This authority, of course, is not absolute but conditional. It is granted to be used
in the enforcement of certain rules which all States have understood and accept-
ed in advance. The Presidency itself is also bound by these rules and can be call-
ed to order if it neglects them.
The third step is to give the Presidency the organizational and personal  resources
it needs to carry out its tasks. Because of the variations in individual States
capabilities and administrative arrangement, each Presidency must ultimately be
left to settle the detailed distribution of its own burdens. But certain general prin-
ciples can be laid down in this matter, and certain useful possibilities may be
identified.
Each of these three points is developed in more detail below.
1 . Responsibilities of the Presidency
The formal references to the role of the Presidency, in the Treaties and the Coun~
cil's Rules of Procedure, are extremely brief. The complex development of its ac-
tual responsibilities has been a pragmatic process, reflecting wider trends in insti-
tutional development. The following is meant as a practical, not a legal, definition
of the main tasks the Presidency should perform (a) It convenes meetings of the  Council of Ministers.  It is responsible for advance
preparation of the agenda; for the circulation of the necessary documents; for
the allocation of time at the meeting and the conduct of debate; for the for-
mulation and implementation of decisions. The Presidency s basic duty in this
process is simply to get results. To do so it must work with technical efficien-
cy, but also exercise a strong and politically sensitive control of the proceed-
ings. It must select for the agenda the items which are most urgent, impor-
tant and ripe for handling. It must prevent time-wasting and confusion at the
meeting itself. It must urge the debate towards conclusions by using the most
appropriate combination of the weapons at its disposal (pressure, mediation
compromise proposals, time-limits, voting).
(b) The Presidency plays a similar role at  the European Council where the proce-
dural framework is less rigid but the need for good conduct and organization
of business even more pressing in view of the potential importance of the re-
sults. The Presidency is responsible for seeing that the agreed practices for
preparing European Council meetings are respected. It must conduct the pro-
ceedings with the right combination of flexibility and sense of responsibility. It
must ensure that conclusions are recorded in proper terms and follow~up or-
ganized through the proper channels. (The details are in our earlier chapter on
the European Council.)
(c) Preparation for and follow-up to the European Council depends heavily on
good co-ordination of the work of various specialized Councils and other bod-
ies. This  horizontal co-ordination  within the Council machinery is a permanent
responsibility of the Presidency. It can only be brought about if the Presiden-
s own representatives - e.g. the Chairmen of specialized Councils - work
themselves in a co-ordinated way. (The methods and limits of this co-ordina-
tion are discussed in a separate section below.
(d)  Vertical co-ordination  is also a Presidency responsibility, and implies that the
Chairmen supplied by the Presidency for bodies below Council level must
work to the same rules and to the same ends as the President of the Council
himself. The Presidency must enforce the procedures for contact between
levels on which good vertical co-ordination depends. For example it must
maintain the right relationship and division of tasks between Council and
COREPER, and ensure that lower-level working groups are efficiently directed
and supervised. (See separate section on vertical co-ordination.
(el In  relations with other institutions  the Presidency must act with efficiency and
neutrality as the spokesman of the Council as a whole. Its main duties in this
regard are collaboration with the Commission and contact and consultation
with the Parliament, including the organization of the Council's joint meetings
with the latter (on the Budget and in conciliation). It must also set the righttone, and find the right procedures, for the Council's relations with a variety
of other bodies involved in the decision-making process (including the ESC
and Court of Auditors). Where these relations are crucial to the success of
the Council's own efforts - as is true  par excellence  of the Commission, but
also of the Parliament on conciliable legislation  contact must be maintain-
ed not only at Council level but through all the various stages of preparation.
This is a further important aspect of vertical co-ordination.
(f) The Presidency has certain responsibilities for representing the Community in
the world at large. Its heaviest burden in the external field is theadministra-
tion of  political co-operation.  No permanent secretariat exists for PoCo work
and the Commission s role is much more limited than under the Treaties. The
Presidency is thus alone responsible for the management of business, ranging
from the practical organization of meetings to the maintenance of a flow of
ideas and initiatives. Even for the largest State, to run the PoCo machine ef-
fectively at full capacity means a considerable drain on res-ources. Efforts
have been made in the PoCo framework from time to time to devise ways of
sharing or otherwise easing the Presidency s burden. While we do not wish to
go into the possibilities in detail, it is clear that any such improvements in Po-
Co administration would make it easier for each State to shoulder the tasks of
the Presidency as a whole and would serve the general aim we have in view.
Presidency Planning
This a(:count has brought out the multiplicity and complexity of the Presidency
duties in the modern Community. One of the greatest problems for a State tak-
ing the Chair is to form an overall view of the tasks awaiting it and a coherent
plan for handling them. Most countries have tackled this by drawing up a list of
Presidency objectives' which may be more or less public and more or less explic-
it. We propose that every Presidency should be asked to do this in future, with
two main stipulations. The process should be explicit and governed by certain
rules; and the working priorities defined by the European Council, as explained in
the previous chapter, should be respected. The Presidency s programme will
need to cover new, continuing and recurring tasks in all the main fields of Coun-
cil business. It should be circulated in the Council for the information of all Sta-
tes and all subordinate and specialized bodies. The text can be revised as neces-
sary later to take account of new developments. Towards the end of the six
months the Presidency should be obliged to report to the Council as a whole on
the progress made in implementing the programme, across the board, and on
any tasks and problems that may remain. The following Presidency should be
closely involved in this part of the exercise, to ensure continuity~ It is natural and
useful that the working programme of the Presidency should be debated in the
European Parliament at the start of the six months. The Presidency should in-
form Parliament again at the end of the period of the progress made.A further device for systematizing Presidency efforts and allowing them to 
scrutinized by all States - a progress report on the lower levels of the machin-
ery  will be proposed below. It may be added here that the main precondition
for the coherent exercise of all the Presidency responsibilities listed above - and
indeed for the production of a ' work programme' that will be worth more than
the paper it is written on  is efficient co-ordination  within  the State holding the
Chair. The general problem of co-ordination in Member States will be discussed
later in this chapter.
2. Authority to enforce rules
Member States have already made a number of good rules for the preparation
and conduct of Council business, including the latest dates on which agendas
and documents intended for a particular meeting can be circulated in ad~ance.
These provisions have been given a new binding force by the recent publication
of the Council's formal Rules of Procedure. Similar though less formal guidelines
have been worked out for the timing of preparation for the European Council.
The trouble is that all these rules have been disregarded with impunity, by some
States at all times, and often most flagrantly by the Presidency itself. The results
are last-minute briefings, ill-prepared discussion, confusion over the order of busi-
ness and a general waste of time and effort.
The first stage in putting this right must be to ensure that the necessary rules
exist, and are clearly understood. The Council's Rules of Procedure provide a ba-
sis, but States should reach an equally clear understanding on the timing and
stages of preparation of any meetings not in the regular format, including the Eu-
ropean Council. Where the Commission is contributing documents, it goes
without saying that it should take its own internal measures to meet circulation
deadlines not less strict than those applied to Member States.
Once rules exist, the Presidency must be recognized as the ultimate authority for
enforcing them and Member States must be prepared to bow to its judgment. 
is inevitable that there will be cases requiring some derogation from the rules,
but exceptions should be made only for genuinely exceptional reasons. The con-
verse principle must, of course, also apply. Just as the Presidency can reject a
contribution from any State or institution which arrives too late, Member States
must have the option of refusing to entertain a contribution from the Presidency
which itself breaks the procedural rules.
The selection of items for Council agendas is a matter of particular importance. It
determines not only the output of the Council, but also the prestige and tone of
its discussions and hence the willingness of senior Ministers to give up their time
to attend it. The aim must be to restrict the agenda to a few items of truly politi-cal significance, on which there is a decision ready to be made or some other
concrete contribution that Ministers .alone can offer. The Presidency, in consulta-
tion with the Commission, has a particular responsibility for enforcing discipline
in this respect. It must of course do so on the basis of an objectively perceived
European' interest  not its own national interest - and this means taking ac-
count of the European Council's guidance and the views of other States as ex-
pressed in discussion. On this understanding, we believe it would be justified to
accept as regular practice (without prejudice to the legal position) the enhance-
ment of the Presidency s rights over the agenda introduced experimentally for
some meetings in the past. That is, the Presidency should be able to reject any
substantive item proposed by others for the agenda, consulting the Commission
as necessary. Any State still wishing to raise an extra item should not be allowed
to do so except under 'any other business
3. The Provision of Adequate Resources
Each State taking on the Presidency must make its own decisions about the ex-
tra resources to set aside for Community tasks in the coming six-month period. It
may have to bring in extra officials, or it may be able simply to re-define the du-
ties of existing ones, perhaps freeing them temporarily from any other responsibi-
lities. The Presidency Foreign Minister, who will chair the General Affairs Council
and attend the European Council, is particularly responsible to the Community
for seeing that the necessary dispositions ar~ made. In most though not all coun-
tries, he will also co-ordinate the administrative preparations put in hand at
home. Though the final choices will be his own, there are certain regular sources
of help he may exploit in the interests of maximum efficiency.
(i)  The Council Secretariat  has resources of which all States could with advan-
tage make fuller and more regular use. It possesses a knowledge of proce-
dures, an overall view of the machinery, and an opportunity for neutral assess-
ment of other States' attitudes which even the largest national administration
cannot match. It is particularly well-placed to help the Presidency in prepar-
ing the work programmes and surveys of progress which we have suggested
should be carried out in future in a regular and transparent manner. Below
we shall suggest extra responsibilities for it in the monitoring of work at low-
er levels. The definition of a more productive, and more consistently applied
relationship of support between the Council Secretariat and the Council Pre-
sidency should be a natural accompaniment to the improved definition of the
latter s duties as a whole. The Council Secretariat should prepare itself for
this fuller role, not by increasing its numbers, but by ensuring it has at its dis-
posal people of the right calibre at every level.
This development of the Council Secretariat' s contribution to the manage-
ment of Council business should not, of course, in any way affect the quitedifferent and more independent contribution made by the Commission. To
ensure that the various organs are working in harmony, and that there is no
risk of duplication, the Council Secretariat should continue its practice of
consulting very closely with the responsible Commission officials at depart-
mental level.
(ij)  Sharing of burdens  should be an option to be used with complete flexibility
at the Presidency s own discretion. It should not be obligatory or tied to any
set pattern. The aim is to fill gaps in resources and capabilities as they arise
on the merits of each particular case. For instance the Chairman of a lower-
level working group may have acquired great expertise in managing a given
dossier under the previous Presidency. If there is a prospect of completing
the dossier in a few months more, the new Presidency should be allowed to
ask him to stay on in the Chair for as long as may be necessary. In the Coun-
cil itself, as in the European Council, there may be several ways of sharing
the burden without actually surrendering the Chair. The Presidency coufd, for
example, ask a colleague or colleagues to take on temporarily the joint re-
sponsibilities of the Council in pursuing some particular procedural task or
policy dossier.
(iii)  Junior Ministers normally drawn from the Foreign Ministry, have been used
by several States to assist Foreign Ministers in their tasks both during the
Presidency period and at other times. This device is not equally needed by,
nor suitable for, all the States taking the Chair, but for many it offers a valid
option for dealing with the increased weight and regularity of Presidency du-
ties. Where it is used, however, two important principles need to be obser-
ved. First, the junior Minister is not a substitute. His existence does not relieve
the Foreign Minister (or any other Minister) of responsibility for chairing the
Council, preparing and following \JP the European Council, acting as senior
spokesman for the Council as a whole and generally supervising the ex-
ecution of Presidency tasks. Secondly, the share of the burden which the
junior Minister  is  to carry must be clearly and publicly defined. Only then can
the other States and institutions with which he may have to deal understand
the precise limits of his authority, and grant him the access and the resources
he needs to back up his Chairman effectively. For example, the junior Minis-
ter might devote particular attention to the procedural exercises associated
with horizontal and vertical co-ordination, and to maintaining the day-to-day
contacts with the European Parliament which will be even more demanding
in the aftermath of direct elections. We would think it particularly useful if he
could accompany the Foreign Minister to European Council meetings during
the period of the Presidency. This will give him the clearest possible impres~
sion of the political priorities to which the work of the Presidency at all levels
must be geared, and help him convey the right message to the other organs
with which he deals. For the greater part of his work, the natural collaboratorand channel of contact for the junior Minister will be the 
Chairman of CORE-
PER. It is parti.cularly important that he should keep the Council organs fully
apprised of his intentions and activities. His role is not 
designed as that of an
independent trouble-shooter, but as a collaborator with his Foreign Minister
in representing the will and interests of the Council as a whole.
4. Other Options
These proposals are based on the assumption that the present system of six-
monthly rotation of the Presidency, with each State in turn taking sole 
responsi-
bility, will continue. We have looked at various options for changing the term or
the structure of the Presidency, and we do not believe any of them would help
matters.
A shorter Presidency term would be wasteful of resources since each State
would have to set up the same apparatus, but use it for a shorter period. .It
would give too little time to deploy working strategies, and would multiply the
risks of losing continuity. A one-year Presidency would slow up rotation intole-
rably: in the fully enlarged Community, each State could take its turn only once
every twelve years. The only technical change in the rotation 
whi.ch we  would  re-
commend to States is a change in the dates of the hand-over. At present the
Presidency which takes over on 1 July has one month to get into gear, then a
month's gap for the holidays, and must practically make a fresh beginning in
September. It would be more sensible to begin one 
Presidency term on 1 August
and the other on 1 February. This change would not require Treaty amendment
and could be introduced very simply, by asking any current 
Presidency to stay on
one month longer to reach the new rotation date. It would
, it is true, introduce a
break in the handling of the annual Budget at 
Ministerial level, whose main sta-
ges are in July and November, but the disadvantages of this can be reduced by
good co-ordination between Presidencies.
As to the structure of the Presidency, we believe the rotation of individual States
has, at its best, a double merit. It gives the State involved new experience of and
insight into the affairs of the Community as a whole
, and it gives the Community
the benefit of that State s fresh energies and political commitment. A permanent
Presidency would forfeit both advantages. A compound 
Presidency, such as the
troika' system (the current Presidency flanked by 'Vice-Presidents' from the pre-
ceding and following Presidencies) has been found 
useful for certain specific
tasks in political co-operation and has sometimes been put forward as a more
general solution. Its aim would be to achieve regular 
burden-sharing and toguar-
antee a high degree of continuity from one Presidency to the next. If used sys-
tematically in the Community context it would
, however, bring problems that in
our view quite outweigh the advantages. It would diffuse the political authorityof the Presidency, and weaken the incentive to achievement for the State actual-
ly in the Chair. It would add yet one more negotiating 'tier' and greatly compli-
cate administration. We should prefer to seek the benefits of burden-sharing and
continuity through the more limited and flexible devices outlined in the sections
above.
lightening the Burden
The heaviness of the Council machinery owes something to the fact that the
Council ~ and the Community as a whole  is simply trying to do too much.
The Council's capacity for business, given its dual burden as defined above, is
limited; the various effects of enlargement will, unless counter-measures are tak-
, still further inflate its load. The first step to restoring the Council's efficiency,
and that of the machine as a whole, must therefore be the fixing of clear- priori-
ties and .greater selectivity in the choice of cases for action. Principles and meth-
ods for achieving this are discussed in other sections of our report.
The secondary cause of  lourdeur which needs to be dealt with here, is the ac-
tual method of handling business: failure to find the appropriate level for deci-
sion-taking, and failure to distinguish between major and minor issues and use
the most economical procedures for settling each type.
Finding the right level for decisions  implies a more conscious, and more frequent
use of opportunities for delegation. The Council today attempts to take far too
many decisions which are of .a minor, technical or recurrent nature. These could
be taken in some other body or in some other fashion, without any damage to
the principle of political control.
There are two main options for reducing the Council's burden of decision-mak-
ing, both of which should be used more frequently. The first and most classic sol-
ution is  delegation to the Commission.  The second option consists of  devolving
decisions of little or no political significance to lower levels in the Council's own
machinery.  The practicalities of both options will be discussed in turn.
(a)  Delegation to the Commission
Delegation may involve the straightforward handing over of a task, or the estab-
lishment of a procedure whereby the Commission takes day-to-day decisions in
consultation with representatives of Member States (i.e. 'management' and
other similar committees). A great many delegations of both kinds have been
and continue to be made, but serious difficulties have been encountered recently
over the establishment of 'management' -type committees in newer policy fields.It is in the interest of both institutions involved to overcome these difficulties. if
the Council is not to succumb totally to its burdens and if reasonable spare capa-
city for progress is to be maintained.
However, the anxieties which have caused the problems in specific cases are not
hard to understand. When the Community moves into a new area of action Sta-
tes find it difficult to anticipate all of the problems that may arise in execution;
apparently small practical implementing de.cisions could create political difficulties
or alter the impact of the policy itself in unforeseen ways. Hence the reluctance
of some States to delegate any implementing powers to the Commission unless
some kind of emergency procedure for dealing with cases of political difficulty
can be agreed. And if anxieties of this kind are not satisfied, no delegation will
take place at aiL
Our approach to dealing with this difficult problem would be as follows:
(i) In areas where powers have already been delegated to the Commission, the
previous arrangements must continue to apply. There can be no question of
clawing back' the degree of independence the Commission enjoys in, for
instance, the daily administration of the CAP.
(ii) The different operational requirements in various areas where the Commis-
sion may be granted new delegated powers should be recognized. The day~
to-day pressures dominating the work of a CAP Management Committee are
different from the requirements on a Legislation Committee, Technical Pro-
gress Committee, etc. A few stock formulae should be worked out between
Council and Commission to cover each of the separate types of committee;
the appropriate formula can then be selected for insertion without dispute in
each new Regulation making a delegation.
(iii) In cases where States have anxieties of the kind described above over poten-
tial problems in the exercise of delegated powers (as is the case at present
on various dossiers connected with the execution of the Budget), the Com-
mission should be prepared to come to a political understanding with the
Council to cover any actual cases of difficulty. The institutions might agree to
use the ever-present possibility of raising in the Council a decision proposed
under the Regulation in question which appears to cause serious political (or
policy) difficulties.
(b)  Devolution within the Council Structure
The Council can ease its own burdens by allowing itself to take decisions by 
simpler and faster method in future. Thus in certain Regulations, adopted byunanimity for example under Article 235 of the Treaty, which establish new poli-
cies the Council has agreed to take aU the more routine and recurring decisions
involved in the policy by a qualified majority. This practice should be continued
wherever possible.
Most often, however, the solution lies in  more responsibility for COREPER and its
subordinate bodies.  States have agreed in the past that COREPER should, on in-
structions, be able to find solutions to more questions of a minor or routine na-
ture. These can then be put to the Council as  A'  points or by the written proce-
dure: systems which allow the Council to adopt decisions without discussion un-
less any State signals last-minute objections. 'A' points are already very num-
erous and have proved their worth in saving Ministers' time and effort. If they
are to be further increased and delegation to COREPER made more effective, the
Presidency must use its authority to prevent matters being referred up from
COREPER to the Council when they do not really deserve the latter s att.ention.
Permanent Representatives need to enjoy a status, and a freedom in negotiation
within suitably framed instructions, that reflects their unique pivotal role between
the Community apparatus on the one hand and Member Governments on the
other. We do not think this role would be any better exercised if the status of
Permanent Representatives were formally altered, for instance by appointing State
Secretaries (junior Ministers) as members of COREPER. More probably it would
become impossible. The most important factor in allowing COREPER to function
well is, in fact, efficient co-ordination of Community business at home. This is
the only way to ensure that varying national interests can be weighed and recon-
ciled early enough to give Permanent Representatives instructions allowing defin-
itive solutions at COREPERlevel. It will also permit a steady flow of information
to Permanent Representatives on the activities of the bodies set up alongside
COREPER, so that instructions sent to these bodies do not escape or conflict
with COREPER's overall guidance. (More will be said about the importance of
domestic co-ordination at the end of this chapter).
COREPERitself is too high a level for some decisions. The numerous sub-com-
mittees and working groups set up under Council authority were designed to re-
lieve its burdens by taking on the detailed examination of Commission proposals,
procedural questions, etc., and resolving as many points of difficulty as possible
in advance. Sometimes they do this efficiently. More often they refer back up-
wards points which they should really have been able to deal with themselves, or
deal with them impossibly slowly. This has something to do with inefficient
methods of decision-taking (see below). It also reflects the failure of Member
States to appreciate the conditions needed to let these lower-level bodies find
their due share of solutions. These conditions are exactly the same as for CORE-
PER; adequate discretion for national representatives, and the early and co-ordi-
nated preparation of positions in national capitals.The most economical procedures for decision-taking  inevitably raise the sensitive
issue of voting. It is perhaps necessary to stress again, before tackling this sub-
ject, that we are trying to deal in our report with actual phenomena and practical
solutions. We do not see it as our task either to propagate or to prejudice any
particular philosophical view.
There can be no doubt that the 'Luxembourg Compromise in reality an agree-
ment to disagree - has become a fact of life in the Community. In the reality of
the Community today, voting cannot be used to override individual States on
matters which they regard as involving very important interests.
There can also be no doubt that an atmosphere has developed in which - even
on minor issues and in quite humble circles  States can obstruct agreement for
reasons which they know full well to be insufficient, but which are never brought
into the open let alone seriously challenged by their colleagues.
Member States have publicly agreed (Paris declaration of December 1974) that
the solution to this is to stop demanding  de facto  unanimity on the whole range
of decisions and by implication to resort more often to voting. Of course this is
not a solution for  all  decision-taking problems. On many important matters un-
animity is the Treaty rule and must continue to 
apply. Majority votes  as such  are
not possible in COREPER and subordinate groups. These forums must find some
more informal consensus method of reaching their due share of solutions. But if
voting is to make what contribution it can to efficiency in the Council, some way
must be found of putting the general commitment of the Paris declaration into
practical effect. We suggest the following working principle. In all cases where
the Treaty does not impose unanimity, and very important interests are not in-
volved for any State, voting should be the normal practice after an appropriate
but limited effort for consensus has been made. This does not mean an actual
vote will be taken each time. Often the mere prospect of resort to vote will en-
courage States to join in a compromise.
This rule is subject to the important exception reflected in the 'Luxembourg
Compromise . We are opposed to trying to define set classes. of ' major' and
minor' decisions and making voting wholly automatic on the latter. Each State
must remain the judge of where its very important interests lie. Otherwise it
could be overruled on an issue which it sincerely considered a 'major' one. It is
only when all States feel sure that this will not happen that they will all be willing
to follow normal voting procedures on other issues. However, the manner of ap-
peal to the 'Luxembourg Compromise' needs to be better defined. A State which
wants to avert a vote because of very important interest should say so clearly
and explicitly, and take responsibility for the consequences in the name of its
whole Government.The application of these solutions lies in the hands of the Presidency. The Chair-
man of the Council is best placed to judge whether and when a vote should be
called. Often, the most effective way for the Presidency to 'normalize' voting will
be for it to announce at the start of each Council the agenda items on which it
intends that a vote should be taken. On other occasions the judgment on whe-
ther a vote is appropriate might be delayed until later in the discussion. The vote
will bec9me an instrument like any other in the arsenal of an efficient Presidency,
to be used flexibly and as necessary in combination with others (compromise for-
mulae, backstairs negotiation). The overall effect must be to increase the fre-
quency of voting, beyond the Budget area where it is already standard practice.
Provided this increase is linked with acceptance of the 'Luxembourg Compro-
mise' as a fact of life, we believe no State can do other than benefit from it.
A similar principle should apply  mutatis mutandis  at lower working levels. In
working groups and COREPER, the Presidency must ensure that work on an is-
sue is terminated when a good working majority has emerged. If a minority is
persistently obstructing agreement, this should be the signal not for abandoning
attempts at a solution but for referring the dossier to the level immediately
above.
Vertical and Horizontal Co-ordination
Good  vertical co-ordination  starts with, and is crucially dependent on, a proper
relationship between the European Council and the Council of Ministers. We
have explained in the previous section what form we think this relationship
should take.
Vertical communication at the next stage, between the Council of Ministers and
COREPER, does not seem to be a major problem. It is anchored firmly on the at-
tendance of Permanent Representatives or their Deputies at Council meetings.
The difficulty here is to find the right division of tasks between the political and
the official body, so that the latter prepares the former s work efficiently in terms
of both timing and substance. Here again the Presidency cannot avoid the ulti-
mate responsibility.
The most difficult area is  the relationship between CORE PER and the bodies be-
low it.  We have already stressed the need for the working groups to play their
part in decision-taking by eliminating the maximum number of technical pro-
blems. We have pointed out the changes in behaviour of national representa-
tives, the improvement in their instructions, and the firmer handling by the Presi-
dency that are necessary to achieve this. But how can performance on these
points be monitored, and political control asserted over the whole bottom-heavy
machine?There are two parts to the solution: the manner in which tasks are delegated
downwards, and the opportunities for referring them back up again.
The working groups should not - as too often happens now - be handed their
tasks without comment. They need clear guidance on the policy context of the
proposal they are to examine, the urgency with which States regard it and the
main features in it which they support or wish to see altered. On proposals in the
main current of Community business, the superior bodies should be able to set
the working groups' activity in the context of the overall six-monthly work pro-
gramme, which is based in turn on the European Council's priorities. On major
new proposals where no such overall guidance exists COREPER (or even the
Council) should hold a special 'orientation debate' to set the scene for further
handling of the item. This debate must, of course, be based on substantial and
we.ll-considered instructions from capitals and the Presidency should refuse to
declare discussion completed until and unless such instructions are obtained.
Specific deadlines for referral back to COHEPER (or other mandating body)
should be set whenever possible.
In spite of these instructions  or on the older dossiers, for lack of them 
work at the technical level may sometimes reach an impasse. Some mechanism
is needed to ensure that control is reasserted from above in these cases and de-
lays not allowed to accumulate. Formal responsibility for referring a dossier back
up from one level to another rests with the Presidency and it is right that it
should remain there. It is above all for the Chairman of COREPER and his aides
to ensure that the Chairmen of lower bodies report to them as soon as they have
exhausted their own means for a solution. The presence of the Council Secreta-
riat at all meetings is, however, a useful additional check. The Council Secretariat
should be allowed and encouraged to bring to the attention of the Chairman of
the next superior body any delays which they consider excessive, together with
their own analysis of the probl.ems involved. The Commission has, of course,
means of its own to achieve a similar result. No matter who takes the initiative
the aim in such cases should be to review the dossier at a level - COREPER 
the equivalent  high enough to allow any obstacles set up by officials on 'poli~
tical' grounds to be assessed at their true value, and any unreasonable national
positions exposed. The dossier should not be referred back down again, except
on a very specific and time-limited mandate.
It will be useful, at least until the vertical transmission of priorities has started
working in a regular manner, for the Presidency to offer the Council at the start
and end of every six-month period  i.e. at the same time as the general work
programme is examined - a .complete survey of the work being done at lower
levels. This. report should make clear how far pre-set deadlines and priorities are
being respected. It will give the Council as a whole a .chance to satisfy itself on
the management of its subordinate machinerY.Horizontal co-ordination as suggested above, is essential to off-set the increas~
ing fragmentation of Community business. Some corrective is needed for the
development ofspezialized 'empires' with their own procedural peculiarities 9p.d ,
their own notions of priority. But this must be approached in a" realistic spirit. 
system of co-ordination which giverts the whole flow of business to pass
through new artificial 'check-poin ' is more trouble than it is worth. A more
rational approach is to observe the places at which the various streams of busi-
ness already tend to flow together, and concentrate efforts for overall control at
those places.
In the Community today, the only place at which full co-ordination of  policies
can be achieved is the European Council. We believe the co-ordinating potential
of the European Council should be recognized and more regularly exploited in
future. The plan of priorities we have proposed above is one step towards
achieving this.
Once policy lines are set, however, there is a need for administrative and proce-
dural co-ordination to ensure that the agreed priorities are respected throughout
the machine. Here  Foreign Ministers  have a special role to play.
They are present at the European Council and must take responsibility for seeing
that its wishes are passed on to and noted by the others involved. This, together
with their special role in deciding institutional matters, gives them a  central posi-
tion  among the spreading branches of the Council. It also gives them .a right to
know what is going on in the specialized areas, so that they can make a sensible
assessment of other Councils' contributions to the preparation of the European
Council, and review the overall state of play on Presidency work programmes.
. The Presidency must put itself in a position to marshal this information by the
best means it has available.
We see no point, however, in trying to restore the ' General Affairs' Council to
the  dominating position  it enjoyed in the early years. Foreign Ministers cannot
now Claim the authority to overrule their specialized colleagues in their own parti-
cular fields. The task of reconciling conflicting sectoral interests has moved up-
ward to the level of Heads of Government.
Where we believe the General Council's role could and should be reasserted is 
relation to the  newer specialized Councils.  These have proliferated in recent
years, far more rapidly tqan the concrete burden of business with which they
have to deal, and no consistent principle has emerged for relating the number
and frequency of meetings to real operational needs.
We believe that no Council should meet without a Clear idea of the purpose it is
to perform. The Councils which meet least frequently are particularly prone tolack such purpose, either because they work in traditional areas where conditions
have changed greatly, or because they cover new policy fields where little con~
sensus exists on the way forward. Some way must be found to debate these
basic questions of purpose and policy orientation, whether in the particular
Councils themselves, in the General Affairs Councilor at European Council level.
The recent history of the Energy Council has shown the stimulating effect and
practical usefulness for such Councils' work of a clear statement of guidance
from Heads of Government. To help the specialized Councils focus their agendas
on genuine policy issues, and limit their meetings to occasions when such issues
exist, more use should be made of the possibility of having small legislative items
in their areas put on the Agenda of the monthly General Affairs Council when
they are ready for adoption. Specialized Ministers may attend to take part in
such decisions if they wish.
The principle of not holding Council meetings where there is insuff!cient business
applies, of course, just as much to the Foreign Affairs, Finance and Agriculture
Councils.
These recommendations do not amount to creating .a real centre of co-ordination
at Council level. This lack need not be a weakness, provided there is a further
check-point' through which business can be routed and supervised lower down.
This check-point does exist, at least potentially, in the shape of COREPER. The
Committee of Permanent Representatives is designed to occupy even more of a
central position' than the General Council which supervises it, insofar as in its
various formations it discusses the agenda of all Council meetings. Some of its
substantive control over the separate fields of business has been irretrievably lost
to new 'high-level' bodies. But it should still be capable of regaining an 'over-
view' function in the technical phases of work rather like that which the Euro-
pean Council occupies at the political level.
Enough has been said already about COREPER's responsibilities in relation to the
working groups. and in the preparation and lightening of the Council agenda.
The problem that remains is that of the ' parallel' bodies set up to achieve high-
level preparation of the work in specialized Councils. We do not think it practical
or necessary, to suppress the more well-established of these (the Special Com-
mittee for Agriculture, the various committees under the ECO/FIN Council), any
more than the Agriculture or Finance Councils could themselves be suppressed.
What is important is that COREPER should both receive, and be free to discuss,
timely information on their activities. This depends partly on good liaison within
Permanent Representations and national administrations.
Efficient co-ordination on these lines demands mastery of information and good
judgment from the representatives of all States, particularly in the General Coun-
cil and COREPER. It implies the existence of a corresponding 'overview' capacitywithin national Governments (see the separate passage on this subject below).
But the responsibilities it involves fall most heavily on the Presidency, which will
need to make full use of the support of the Council Secretariat. The closest col-
laboration is also needed between the managers of Council business and their
opposite numbers in the Commission. The Commission, as shown in the section
dealing with its affairs below, can by effective co-ordination of its own efforts
make a decisive contribution to coherent functioning in the Council as well.
Recapitulation
The general approach we have proposed for the problems of the Council machi-
nery is the same as for the other institutions: identification of overall priorities,
and a clear central authority to allocate resources in accordance with them and
monitor the implementation. The suggestions we have made on a regular Presi-
dency work programme, and improvements in vertical and horizontal co-ordina-
tion, carryon the theme established in the previous chapter where we spoke of
the European Council's 'Master Plan
To tackle the problems of  lourdeurin  the characteristic forms which they take in
the Council, we have identified four main directions for improvements:
reinforcement of the Presidency in its authority to apply agreed rules, and in
its ability to draw on the necessary resources;
~ more use of normal voting procedures on matters not engaging very impor-
tant interests;
greater use of COREPER's potential for supporting the Council and supervis-
ing lower levels of the machine;
extension of the Commission s delegated management powers, and their use
on agreed terms in new areas.
These various types of adjustment should balance and reinforce each other. They
can be further underpinned by ensuring that all national administrations involved
in Community affairs play their part more efficiently, a point discussed in the final
pages of this chapter.
Rules of Procedure
It has been suggested that improvements in Council practices could best be
brought about, and given permanence, by writing suitable provisions into theCouncil' s rules of procedure. These have only very recently been adopted in a
definitive form.
At several points in this section we have stressed the need for better definition,
for example of Presidency rights and duties. Inscription in the rules of procedure
would be an obvious way to bring about that definition. Some of the specific
ideas we have put forward (e.g. Presidency discretion to maintain a previous
Chairman in office) might in any case require amendment to the rules.
Our main interest, however, is to see the necessary improvements implemented
rapidly. They should not be delayed while States try to agree on a precise formu-
la to insert in rules which are now legally binding. In any case, many of our pro-
posals require a flexibility and exercise of discretion which might be hampered
rather than helped by written formulae.
We hope, therefore, that States might consider first which improvements in
Council practices they wish to adopt. Then, as a secondary question, and after
implementation has got under way, they may discuss which of them they would
like to enshrine in the definitive rules.
The Responsibility of National Capitals
We have already stressed the crucial importance for the functioning of the Com-
munities of what goes on in national capitals. It is time to look at this aspect
more closely. What contribution could national administrations make, through
their own arrangements, to the better functioning of the central institutions?
The 'Brussels bureaucracy' consists mainly of national experts visiting Brussels
more or less frequently to deliberate together. The main decision-making organs
the Council and its substructure  are made up of national delegations. It is
clear, therefore, that the efficiency of Community decision-taking depends in the
highest degree on the nature of the instructions - or the lack of them - formu-
lated by the authorities at home.
We have made a survey, with the help of information from States themselves, of
the arrangements for handling Community business set up in the various capi-
tals. The most striking feature of these is their diversity. There are significant dif-
ferences in the allocation of prime co-ordinating responsibility; in the amount and
frequency of Ministerial discussion; in the importance of the role played by nation-
al Parliaments. This variety is a reflection of the diverse historical, constitutional
and political factors at work. It would be neither right nor realistic to try to elimi-
nateit by imposing some 'harmonized' model of a domestic co-ordinating sys-
tem. The systems which do work well already are themselves quite differentfrom each other. Each State will achieve greatest efficiency with the solutions
that best match its individual needs and traditions. However, the  tasks  to be per-
formed by each national administration are virtually the same. The Community as
a whole cannot operate efficiently unless  all  States achieve a consistent standard
in executing them. It may therefore be worth spelling out here what general
functions we believe each governmental machine should be able to perform.
The greater part of the burden consists of preparing instructions, to be transmit-
ted to the Permanent Representation or carried to Brussels by visiting officials.
The first requirement is that these instructions  and any other contribution
which the State has undertaken to make to the discussion ~ should be prepared
in good time.  Slowness of response in the early stages of work on a dossier does
not achieve conservation of effort. It merely faces all States with the need for
desperately quick adjustment in the final stages as obstacles not properlyidenti-
fied earlier start to emerge. It also defeats the whole aim of achieving solutions
at the lowest possible level which we see as crucial for the efficiency of the
Council machine. Secondly, the instructions must be 
considered.  They should
not be based on an instinctive, usually defensive reaction but on a proper weigh-
ing of the merits of the case from both a national and a Community point of
view. Such careful consideration should not only minimise the need for later
changes of course. It should allow the issue to be judged with a due sense of
proportion and instructions to be given which allow the negotiators the full flexi-
bility that national interests permit. Finally and essentially, the instructions must
be  coherent  both as regards the line taken in lower and higher forums, and as re-
gards the various related fields of Community business. This kind of co-ordina:-
tion of policy positions and procedures in .capitals is, in the last analysis, almost
more important than co-ordination at the Community level. Even a perfectly inte-
grated set of institutions in Brussels will fail to function if the instructions coming
to different parts of the machinery from a single State conflict with each other.
Conversely, the multiplication of forums at Community level can be completely
offset (in administrative terms) by a State which sends consistent instructions to
each separate body.
One feature should be mentioned which has a contribution to make to co-ordina-
tion in  all  States. That is the participation in national policy-making of the Perma-
nent Representative and his advisers. The Permanent Representative is uniquely
placed both to scan the whole range of instructions sent to Brussels by national
departments and to gauge their impact on his State s interests in Community bu-
siness. He must first be allowed the access to information needed to make such
judgments. He must then be given a chance to impress the lessons learned on
his national masters at the political, as well as the official, level. Those States
which invite their Permanent Representatives regularly to high policy-forming
committees have testified to the advantages of such a practice.The need to standardize tasks, while keeping some flexibility in the choice of
means for executing them, has been a constant theme in our section on Council
business. It lies behind our recommendations for the setting of priority lists and
work programmes, the reinforcement of control of agendas, more regularity in
preparation of and follow-up to European Council meetings and so on. Such reg-
ular management exercises will help make the management functions demanded
of all Member States increasingly obvious. We trust they will also inspire States
to find early remedies for such insufficiencies at home as come to light in the
process.
The Council among the Institutions
Since we have spent so long on the internal problems of the Council, the point
made in the general introduction to Chapter II must be stressed again in conclu-
sion. The Council cannot reach its full efficiency in isolation. It is -critically depen-
dent on the Commission for the greater part of its work which rests on the lat-
ter s legislative proposals. By the quality of its initial contribution, and by the way
it intervenes in subsequent discussion  including possible amendments to or
withdrawal of the proposal - the Commission can make all the difference to the
outcome of the Council' sefforts. The triangle of Treaty-based consultation which
has the European Parliament (and often the Economic and Social Committee) at
its third point can enrich the end-product or complicate and retard it depending
on the sp.irit in which the various institutions approach one another. This is why
the sensitive and efficient handling of relations with other institutions is so vital a
responsibility of the Presidency, and indeed of the Council as a whole. Its impor-
tance will be further brought out and improvements discussed in the following
sections on the Commission and the Parliament.IV. The Commission
Introduction
Without the European Commission, the Community could never have been con-
structed. Without the Commission, the Community could not function even with
the limited efficiency that it does today.
The Commission s role under the Treaties has three main components. First, the
right of initiative: except in very rare cases, all legislative action by the Council
takes place on the basis of a Commission proposal. Secondly, the Commission is
the guardian of the Treaties and has power to act on infringements of their provi-
sions (e.g. to ban State aids which conflict with the rule on competition). Thirdly,
the Commission is designed by Treaty to be the Community s executive arm. In
order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market
it may receive delegated powers not only to carry out Council decisions, but to
take on its own authority the day-to-day measures needed to keep common poli-
cies functioning and up-to-date.
Over the years since the Treaties were signed, the circumstances in which the
Commission exercises these three functions have changed profoundly. The effect
of many of the changes has, undeniably, been to reduce the Commission
standing and authority from the very high level at which it stood in the early
years. The balance of power between Commission and Council has shifted more
and more in the latter s favour and the Commission has lost much of its indepen-
dent prestige.
In this section we shall first try to analyse the real causes of the Commission
decline. How far were they external, and irreversible? How far did they reflect
internal failings on the Commission s part and its inability to adjust to changed
circumstances? We shall then consider how the Commission s organization might
be improved to eliminate this second source of weakness. Finally we shall try to
show what role the Commission can and should be playing in the present-day
Community, in the interests both of efficiency and of further progress, and what
conditions are required to allow its potential contribution to be realized in full.Elements in the Commission s Decline
The external factors tending to weaken the Commission are the same as have
hampered the development of Europe as a whole. They have already been ana-
lysed in the introduction to this report.
The conditions for exercising the Commission s role of initiative changed as the
detailed guidance contained in the Treaties was gradually exhausted. The Com~
munity had to move into new areas to maintain progress and meet fresh challen-
ges. Since these areas were not covered by detailed Treaty provisions the Com-
mission s role as interpreter of the Treaties was no longer such a guaranteed
source of strength. Of course the Commission could make proposals on new
rules, but it was not certain these would fit in with Governments' own concep-
tions of the way ahead. If they did not, Member States tended increasingly to
work out the lines of a new policy themselves, sometimes resorting to non-Treaty
methods which reduced the Commission s say in the process of implementation
as well.
Even within the Treaties, the Commission s scope for elaborating and enforcing
policy obligations was steadily reduced. Economic troubles .Ieading to political/
social weaknesses at home were driving Governments into more nationalistic atti-
tudes both on Community policy in general and in the daily working of the insti-
tutions. This affected the Commission directly insofar as States were less willing
to heed its advice or to let it administer policies in the ' European interest. It
also weaken€:d indirectly the Commission s hold over the legislative process. A
Council in which States fought for narrowly national interests was not a place in
which the Commission could easily mediat~ by appealing to the common
ground. The scarcity of voting and prevalence of consensus procedures meant
that the Commission could no longer decide the outcome by adjusting its propo-
sals until a majority of States were in favour. More often the Council itself, by
unanimity, amended the Commission s proposal on lines worked out in a Presi-
dency compromise.
Lacking an independent power to decide new policies, the Commission had no
chance of by-passing these obstacles. The essential fact of its dependence on
the Council, as the decision-making organ, could never be more than partly off-
set by the calibre and effectiveness of the Commission s own personnel. Com-
mission weakness was to this extent a product of Council attitudes, which in
their turn were partly determined by economic/political trends.
However, the external constraints on the Commission s effectiveness were ac-
companied by a lack of coherence, and increasing bureaucracy, in its own inter-
nal operations. Since the enlargement of the Commission in 1967, there has
been a loss of collegiality in its members' method of working, combined with in-adequate internal co-ordination. The increase in numbers of Commissioners
l11adeit impossible to give equally meaningful portfolios to them all; 'in practice
this has led to an overload of work for some Commissioners, frustration for
others. The Commission has no strong image as a team: it has been the actions
of its President or individual members that have made most impression on the
world outside. In its organization generally, there is a lack of collegiate manage-
ment and no collective policy approach. Inadequate overall planning, and lack of
communication between Commissioners and other levels of the administration
have adversely affected both efficiency and morale among the Commission
staff.
The combination of all these factors has weakened Commission performance in
each of the three provinces listed above. The Commission no longer intervenes
as strongly or flexibly as it used to in the process of Council negotiation. The
development of national attitudes described above causes increasing problems
for the Commission in exercising its role as guardian of the Treaties. The - Com-
mission s management role is carried out effectively where it exists already. Its
development has been hampered mainly by the difficulty of obtaining Council as-
sent to certain delegations in new fields. Sometimes the implementation of cer-
tain policies has been handicapped in consequence.
Tackling the Internal Weaknesses
The internal problems of the Commission were the subject of a study carried out
recently by a group appointed by the Commission itself and headed by Ambassa-
dor Spierenburg. Their report, published a few weeks ago, seems to us to have
found the right approach to all the major failings in organization mentioned
above. It would be idle for us to cover the same ground in detail. We shall men-
tion only briefly the main points in the Spierenburg group s report which we
should like to endorse.
1. We agree that to continue to extend Commission membership on the present
basis after enlargement could be fatal for the organization s coherence and effi-
ciency. Adequate portfolios could not be found for a total of 17 Commissioners
and more and more Members would be relegated in effect to a ' junior' status. All
hope of collegiate operation would be lost. We therefore support the proposal
that in future the Commission should be composed of one Member per country
(and the President found within that number). We also agree that the switch to
the new principle must be made at the next re-appointment of the Commission
which usefully coincides with Greek accession (January 1981). If the will cannot
be found to act at this stage, it will certainly not be found at any later date.We appreciate that this change, however clear its operational sense, has political
overtones as well. It will mean dropping the second Commissioner appointed by
each large State at present and thus losing the element of 'weighting' within
the Commission structure. We believe all States will see on reflection that this
need not significantly damage their interests. The Commission is not designed
for direct representation of national views. This job is already done in the Council
of Ministers, which has the final power of decision. The Commission s distinctive
job is to represent in all its activities the common interest of Europe. The useful-
ness of its proposals does not depend on the number and nationality of its mem-
bers so much as on the way they work together and develop a politically balanc-
edconception of their task. In a Commission where all major policy issues are
discussed collectively, each Member can exert across the whole range of policy
as much influence as his personal standing justifies. It is up to each State to ap-
point a person who will make an appropriately weighty contribution to the think-
ing of the Commission as a whole.
2. The structure of the Commission must be slimmed down and rationalized at all
levels. The number of Directorates-General should be reduced as rapidly as pos-
sible and brought into a simple and rational relationship with the number of port-
folios. This is the best way to guarantee that a more coherent impulsion from the
top level of the Commission will take effect all the way through the machinery.
3. The college of Commissioners must be more homogeneous. The portfolios
should be as evenly distributed as possible. The college should deliberate collec-
tively on major policy questions. This will demand that Commissioners spend
more time in discussion with each other, and they must be available in Brussels
for the purpose.
4. Administrative co-ordination within the Commission must be strengthened.
The Presidency of the Commission must be given both the means and the capa-
city to redeploy the institution s resources in accordance with policy priorities.
The grouping of central services - budget, personnel, administration, etc.  dir-
ectly under the Presidency is a logical step to this end. A Member of the college
of Commissioners should be given special responsibility for supporting the Presi-
dent in his administrative tasks: he must be a person with whom the President
can work on close terms.
5. There is a need for better personnel management, including more rational
planning of the Commission s future staff requirements. Any procedure which in-
troduced a more objective element into the assessment of staffing needs would
be a worthwhile improvement. (Those responsible for staff management in the
Council Secretariat, European Parliament and other organs should look carefully
at this part of the Spierenburg group s findings, with a view to identifying any
ideas for improvement which might  mutatis mutandis  be useful in their own insti-
tutions).6. The authority of the Commission s President needs strengthening in every way
possible. In our conception of inter-institutional relations, he must have the per-
sonal authority to playa full partin the Community s affairs at the highest level
including the meetings of the European Council which he attends as of right. He
should also be able to marshal the resources of his institution effectively.
, The President of the Commission should continue to be .chosen. personally by the
European Council at least six months in advance of the other Members. Member
States should consult closely with him on the Commissioners they mean to ap-
point. We accept the view that a Government should not persist in offering a
candidate to whom the President has objected. But the President's standing
could be further enhanced in the matter of the distribution of portfolios, over
which he already enjoys considerable influence. We should like to see this au-
thoritystrengthened by an acceptance by all concerned that in cases of difficulty
over the allocation of portfolios, the President must ultimately have the last
word. More than any new appointment procedure, an understanding on these
lines would commit States to thinking very hard about their nominees. If they
hope to secure a particular portfolio, they must put forward someone who is in-
disputably qualified to receive it.
An Effective Role for the Commission in the Community of today
What role should this more compact and strongly-led Commission play in the
present-day institutional balance?
The danger of its being reduced to the technical role of a 'secretariat' must at all
costs be avoided. Improved efficiency demands that each institution should have
a clear and coherent policy 'line' on the basis of which its dialogue with the
other institutions can take place. The Commission s characteristic contribution to
this dialogue is to make proposals which convey something more than an ap-
proximation of the separate interests of Member States. It should show what
kind of actions would best reflect the larger interests of Europe as a whole. It is
of course the Council which finally decides.
(a) The Role of Initiative and Legislative Work
The Commission must exercise its role of initiative with greater  coherence within
the framework of the priorities agreed at the European Council. The timing and
terms of its proposals should be determined by a programme of policy and oper-
ational objectives, adopted when it is appointed and revised at least once a year.
The overall programme should determine the allocation of administrative resour-
ces and, in broad terms, the amount and type of draft legislation produced by
each Commission department. The flow of Commission drafts has a decisive in-fluence forg.ood or ill on the functioning of the Council machinery and must be
planned with a clear understanding of the requirements and capacity of the lat-
ter. Consultation between the Presidencies of the two institutions, before and af-
ter the formulation of their respective work programmes, is the obvious way of
ensuring this. The production and handling of 'harmonization' proposals, which
make up a high proportion of the workload at lower levels of the Council hier-
archy, poses some more specialized practical questions which are dealt with in
our Annex 2.
The Commission must frame its proposals in a more  independent  manner. To de-
fine precisely how far such independence can be achieved and by what methods
is not easy. Where consultation with States on the general acceptability of poli-
cies is necessary, it should take place at a political level and the duplication of ef-
fort involved in repeated consultations at lower level should be avoided. It is sen-
sible and sometimes essential for the Commission s departmentJ:J to consult na-
tional and other experts on the purely technical background to a proposal. But
they should not, as so often happens now, be drawn into negotiating with them
to find a supposedly acceptable form of the measure. Experience shows that na-
tional officials often use these negotiations to practise obstruction for its own
sake and even when points are agreed they may be repudiated in the Council
framework. If the draft proposals need adjustment to allow for political factors
this should be done, consciously and coherently, when the college of Commis~
sioners itself examines them.
There is scope for more Commission  intervention  in the work of the Council and
its subordinate bodies when the latter are working on legislation. The Commis~
sion should be on the lookout for opportunities to promote progress by .amend-
ing its drafts and mediating between different States and institutions. Its own
procedures for approving changes of stance (especially at the preparatory levels
of discussion) should not be so cumbrous as to make it miss such opportunities
for lack of timely action.
(b) The Management Function
The principle needs to be affirmed yet again that the Commission is the natural
executive organ of the Community. It has already come to .exercise very wide
management powers - the day-to-day running of the CAP would be inconceiv-
able without it - and it has exercised them well. As Community activities be-
come more detailed and more wide-ranging, the need to distribute administrative
burdens to the organs best qualified to bear them becomes more acute. The
Council in particular cannot afford to add to its already oppressive burden of
work; and in our .last chapter we have suggested some ways in which the re-
maining obstacles to further delegations to the Commission might be overcome.(c) Relations with Parliament
The European Parliament has the right to dismiss the Commission as a whole.
The Commission must, therefore, treat the maintenance of good relations with
Parliament as a leading priority. When it takes office and prepares its initial policy
programme, it must go to Parliament to present this programme and take part in
a serious debate. The success of this debate and the terms of any resolutions
passed after it will be crucial for establishing the right relationship between the
two institutions from the outset. But if a good beginning is to be followed up,
the President of the Commission and his colleagues must continue to devote a
fair share of their time and .energy to contacts with the Parliament. The perfor-
mance of various Commissioners has been uneven in this respect and a consis~
tently higher standard should be imposed (see also next chapter).V. The European Parliament
Its Role and Historical Development
The position of the European Parliament in the Community institutional system
, in terms of legal status and formal powers, much weaker than that of any
Western European national Assembly. It is not a legislature and it does not ap-
point an executive. The practical role it plays today has been determined by three
things: the way it has made use of its basic powers; the extensions it has man-
aged to obtain to those powers; and the influence it can exert over and above its
formal rights.
When the Parliament was created most people saw its role as being to supervise
and work in partnership with the Commission. The Treaty gave it the right to dis-
miss the whole Commission by a two-thirds majority of its members. It could put
written and oral questions to Commissioners and call them to account for the
performance of their tasks. It could adopt Opinions proposing amendments to
the Commission s drafts for legislation, and offer the Commission ideas for new
proposals in Resolutions passed on its own initiative.
Over the years, this relationship with the Commission ceased to satisfy the Par-
liament as a sufficient vehicle for its influence. This is partly because the Com-
mission itself did not consistently respect the Parliament's views or even take the
trouble to stay in close contact with it in various areas of policy. It is partly also a
reflection of the Commission s own altered position in decision-making. Even if
the Commission does agree with and incorporate a Parliament amendment in its
draft legislation, it cannot guarantee what the outcome of Council negotiation on
the measure will be. The Parliament has thus turned more and more of its atten-
tion direct to the Council, seeking to influence decisions at the point where they
are actually made.
The original text of the Treaties gave the Parliament a role  vis-a-vis  the Council
insofar as the Council, like the Commission, was bound to take note of the Par-
liament' s Opinions on draft legislation. But this process of taking note has proved
, 'in the main, to be purely formal. Parliament had to find other ways of making
Ministers listen to its views and take them seriously. It has always been able to
put written and oral questions to the Council and to invite the Presidency to its
plenary sessions to answer them. Recently Presidency representatives have star-
ted to attend Parliamentary Committee meetings too. As the joint activities of
Member States have spread beyond the limits of the Treaties, the Parliament has
managed to open up similar channels of contact and information, for instance on
the outcome of European Council meetings and the development of political co-
operation.
But the main change in the relationship between Council and Parliament has
come about with the development of the latter s budgetary powers. The succes-
sive Treaty amendments of 1970 and 1975 gave Parliament the right of the last
word on 'non-obligatory' expenditure,1 subject to some complex rules on the
overall annual increase. Since the class of non-obligatory expenditure now con~
stitutes over 20% of the Budget and covers most Community projects and poli-
cies apart from the Common Agricultural Policy, this puts the Parliament in a
strong position to impress its own concept of policy development upon the
Council. It also creates new possibilities for institutional conflict. The prospect
that the 'non-obligatory' rule will bring expenditure on almost any new policy
into the Council/Parliament battleground has been a real deterrent, for some Sta-
tes, to adopting the new policy in t~e first place. In this field more than any other
inter-institutional rivalry will need to be restrained if progress is not to be totally
blocked. A heavy responsibility lies on the Council as well as the Parliament in
this respect.
It was partly to anticipate and avoid budgetary conflicts that the 'conciliation
procedure was introduced by a Joint Declaration of the three institutions in
1975. This provides for joint Council/Parliament meetings to discuss divergences
of view on certain financially significant legislative measures before the latter are
adopted. The joint declaration in effect acknowledges the logical connection
that exists between budgetary and legislative powers in the area of non-obliga-
tory expenditure; an effective budgetary control calls for some say in legislation
giving rise to expenditure. The practical application of the procedure has thrown
up a number of problems since 1977 and neither institution has been fully satis-
fied with its operation. To summarize: alongside its traditional relationship with
the Commission, the Parliament has now established relations with the Council
which go well beyond the formalities of consultation and have laid the founda-
tion for a serious political dialogue. But the exercise of the Parliament's powers
has thrown up some practical protlfems in the functioning of the Community. In
its efforts to exercise influence it has, because of problems with both machinery
and attitudes, had no consistent success.
1 Defined in the 'Budgetary Powers' Treaty of 22 July 1975 as expenditure not 'necessarily resulting
from this (the EEC) Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance therewith'Direct Elections
It was against this background that the first elections to the Parliament by direct
universal suffrage were held in June this year. This has been hailed as an event
which, while not affecting the Parliament's formal powers, opens the way to a
major extension of its .influence. How this new potential will be translated into
the practical terms of institutional functioning is not yet clear. The present Trea-
ties are flexible enough to allow new developments in the exercise of the Par-
liament' s influence in several directions. The strength of that influence will de-
pend very much on what use the members of Parliament make of their opportu-
nities and on how much public attention they can muster. The distinguishing fea-
tures of the new Parliament are that it is both representative and European: it will
make a distinctive contribution to the institutional balance- and thus enhance its
standing and influence - insofar as it manages to act as a genuinely European
Parliament and to commit itself to the construction of Europe.
However, it is not for us to advise on or predict the course the new Parliament
will take. It will conduct itself according to its own best judgment, and only time
will tell what changes in institutional functioning may result. In the rest of this
section, therefore, we have ,chosen to look at the difficulties in the Parliament'
relations with the other institutions more or less as they stood up to June this
year. We hope the practical suggestions made will not lose all validity in their
, newer setting.
Relations between members of the European Parliament and their respective na-
tional Parliaments raise new practical questions now that only a quarter of the
former have a dual mandate. These relations are necessary to both sides if the
political parties and groupings are to develop their handling of European affairs in
a coherent and constructive manner. Given the limitations on the European Par-
liament' s Treaty rights, it is still national Parliaments which bear the main respon-
sibility for exerting democratic control over their  own  Ministers attending the
Council. The new European Parliament will not stop them doing this, though it
may influence - by feeding back views and informations - the lines on which it is
done in future. It is up to the parties and groups concerned to find the best way
of setting up the necessary contacts in their own particular countries.
Relations with the Commission
The general concept of Commission answerability to the Parliament is clearly
enshrined in the Treaties, and in strictly practical terms it requires no additional
grant of powers to the Parliament to make it effective. The key requirement is
that the Commission itself should adopt a consistent standard of conduct to-
wards the Parliament. It will be better placed to do this when its own central man-
agement and coordination is strengthened as proposed in the preceding section.As to the content of Commission/Parliament relations, the following four points
seem to us particularly important;
(i) The Commission should continue to present its 
overall working programme to the Parliament for debate at regular intervals - currently once a 
year. In the previous section we have stressed the importance of the first programme presented by a new Commission after taking office. Such programmes 
will aid the Parliament not only in developing its Own 'line' on general policy, but also in monitoring the Commission s subsequent action on its undertak- ings.
(ii) Every six months or so, representatives of the Commission should hold talks
with the managers of Parliamentary (and Economic and Social Committee)
business to plan out a consultative programme for the coming period. The major legislative proposals likely to come forward should be identified
, so that the Parliament can consider how to allocate its debating time and other
resources needed to prepare Opinions on them. An observer 
from the Coun~ cil Presidency should be allowed to attend.
(iii) All Commissioners should be prepared to appear in 
person before the Parlia- ment, both in plenary session and in Committee, when matters of any signifi~ cance in their province are to be discussed. Such contacts cannot simply be
left to officials.
(iv) The Commission as a whole should set a higher and more consistent stand-
ard of response to the Parliament on the latter
s Resolutions. Where these contain Opinions on draft legislation the Commission should explain its reac-
tion to any changes proposed by the Parliament
, and inform Parliament regu- larly on the subsequent course of negotiation in the 
Council. Where the Re- solutions are of the 'own initiative' type containing new ideas from the Par- liament, the Commission should say if it intends to follow them up and if 
not why not.
Relations with the Council Machinery
In the section of this report dealing with the Council
, we have listed the adminis- tration of relations with the Parliament as one key responsibility of the 
Presiden- cy. It is the Presidency which speaks for the 
Council in Parliament question-ses- sions, participates in plenary debates and sends representatives to important Committee meetings. A full pattern of contact has been established by these means. To make it satisfactory for both sides
, the main requirements .are (a) that the Presidency should be ready to attend on all occasions when matters of ser- ious interest to both institutions are at stake; and (b) that the Presidency re-presentative should have adequate standing and expertise. Meeting these criteria
conscientiously will make heavy demands on the time and energy of senior mem-
bers of the Council Presidency team. That is why we believe junior Ministers, if
appointed, could be particularly useful in taking on the main task of liaison with
the Parliament. They would not remove the necessity for full Foreign and other
Ministers to attend on important occasions, but they would have more time to
offer themselves and should be able to develop a fuller understanding of the Par-
liament' s position.
It .is also up to the Presidency to take the initiative in improving the Council'
response to the Parliament's Resolutions - both those containing Opinions and
those of the 'own initiative' type. All too often these are simply filed away by
delegations and have no further influence on legislative deliberations. While the
practical influence the Resolutions have will depend on their soundness and
quality, the Presidency should ensure that they are at least drawn to States' at-
tention. On major measures of legislation the Council should fulfil the undertak~
ing it has made to explain why it has accepted or passed over the Parliament's
points. This response can easily be conveyed during the Presidency s various con-
tacts with the Parliament.
The Presidency, together with the Parliament itself, also carries a heavy responsi-
bility for assuring that Council/Parliament contacts .are productive, not disruptive,
in cases where the conciliation procedure applies. The difficulties involved in this
procedure are manifold. We have put some suggestions for dealing with them in
a separate Annex (Annex 3).
The Triangle
In this analysis we have deliberately chosen not to follow the hypothesis of an
increasingly Close Commission/Parliament collaboration in separation from - and
potentially in opposition to - the Council. Direct elections have added a new sti-
mulus to relations between these two institutions, but they are no longer such
pre-ordained allies as in the early years and the Commission is likely to face a
good deal of criticism itself from directly-elected MEPs. A more natural outcome
would be the sort of  triangular  pattern that has already emerged in the years be-
fore Direct Elections, with the Parliament seeking to establish close and direct re-
lations with the Council as well as Commission. This approach would bean effi-
cient one in terms of Community functioning, insofar as it would create a more
complete and stable institutional balance. But to make it work, the Council must
recognize its own responsibility for providing a satisfactory degree of contact and
co-operation.Furthermore, the triangle cannot be considered complete in today s conditions
without direct contact between the Parliament and the European Council. It is
right that the Parliament should be able to communicate direct with those who
steer the political fortunes of the Community at the highest level. A six-monthly
report to it by the President of the European Council in person will give it that
opportunity; and there is nothing to prevent it from laying its own views on ma-
jor issues before Heads of Government in writing on other occasions. Provided
this relationship is developed with due respect for the competences of all the in-
stitutions involved, it could lead to valuable co-operation in the launching of ma-
jor initiatives and help the Parliament to develop its full potential as a sounding-
board for the large policy issues of the day.
The Impact of Public Opinion
The margins of democracy can be widened considerably by Involving public
opinion more closely in policy discussions. Publicity can be an important instru-
ment of democratization in the Community and all the institutions should devote
far more serious attention to it. The work of the Parliament and its relations with
the Commission offer particularly valuable opportunities. The Commission - and
also the Council - should make major policy statements at Parliament's plenary
sessions, which can thus become important occasions for public information and
involvement. The Parliament should also be able to use its Committees for public
hearings on more specialized subjects as appropriate.VI. Other Institutions and Organs
The Community s institutional structure is not limited to the triangle of Council
Commission and Parliament. In our studies we have looked at three other organs
which have important, if specialized roles to play  the Court of Justice, the
Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC).
The  European Court of Justice  is one of the Community s most basic and indis-
pensableinstitutions. It has a close-knit, collegiate membership and few pro-
blems of international co-ordination. The main condition of its effectiveness, now
and in the future, is the maintenance of its perfect independence from Govern-
ments and other Community institutions. That is not to say it has nO administra-
tive problems: for some years it has faced a .growing disproportion between its
organizational resources and its burden of work. But it has produced its own
suggestions for dealing with this, and we see no reason to doubt that solutions
will be found which allow the Court to continue the efficient discharge of its es-
sential duties.
The  European Court of Auditors  has been in existence only since 1977. In its
internal administration, it shares and benefits from the same collegiate structure
that characterizes the Court of Justice. In the Community at large, it is just start-
ing to explore the precise limits of its competence. It has had some trouble find-
ing a harmonious basis for its relations with various institutions, perhaps partly
because it does not yet have the full status of an institution itself. Such uncer-
tainties can be resolved only by a constructive and patient dialogue between
those involved, and it is important that they should be so resolved, although
there are no recommendations we would wish to make ourselves on the subject.
The  Economic and Social Committee  raises different issues. It was set up to pro-
vide a forum for socio-economic consultation in a Community whose activities
were bound to affect economic interest groups in many ways. The Treaty of
Rome gave it the right to be consulted, like the Parliament, on many types of legis-
lation and it is often consulted voluntarily on other matters. However, the ESC
has experienced difficulties of several kinds in defining and executing a satisfac-tory role for itself. Its consultative responsibilities impose a heavy burden of 
tailed business, yet the Opinions it produces are" under-valued and' sometimes
simply overlooked by the Commission and Council. Its wider role as a forum for
social issues is limited by the restricted nature of the Community s own efforts in
the social sphere. Because the ESC's membership has three elements - the third
being 'other interests
' - 
it is not a ready-made vehicle for dialogue between
workers and employers, and additional machinery has been created in specific
cases where such dialogue was needed (e.g. the Tripartite Conference)' . Indivi-
dual interest groups with something at stake in the Community s social/econom-
ic activities often prefer to lobby the decision-making institutions direct.
Socio-economic policy-making at Community leve.1 demands, even in its present
embryonic stage, a well functioning mechanism for consultation between the
central Community institutions and European workers' and employers' organiza-
tions. Any agreement between the two sides providing for regular contact would
be useful from this point of view.
Among the Community forums for socio-economic consultation, the ESC itself
as a Treaty institution, should hold a central place. The deeper problems hamper-
ing it are not of a kind which we can deal with here. They relate to the limited
development of Community social policy, and to the way the ESC's role was de-
fined in the Treaty in the first place: and our mandate does not encourage us 
make proposals for substantive Treaty change. Such suggestions as we can
make are for administrative adjustments of admittedly modest scope.
It is right, for example, that European organizations representing particular socio-
economic interests should be involved in the work of the ESC. Member States
should bear this in mind  using the option of consultation with such organiza-
tions - when selecting candidates for nomination to the Committee. But if the,
involvement is to be lasting, the ESC's work must be handled in such a way as
to hold the interest of leading personalities in all its three groupings. Much detail-
ed work should be executed at section level, so that the plenary debates can be
devoted to large and substantive issues. The ESC could make more use of the
option of addres~ing ' own initiative' Resolutions to the Council, as a way of fo~
cusing and publicizing its debates. Both Council and Commission must pay
more attention to its proceedings and Opinions. Finally, the ESC should make a
special effort for co-operation with the directly elected Parliament, not just at th~
general policy level but in the detailed consultative work on legislative texts
where the institutions' respective Sections and Committees might find many op-
portunities for sharing their burdens.
The annual  Tripartite Conference  between the Council of Ministers and the wor-
kers' and employers ' organizations was instituted to give these organizations clo-
ser contact with Community policy-making in the area of most interest to them.The Conferences held so far have, however, run into procedural problems and
have manifestly failed to satisfy all the parties attending.
Ways will have to be found to make both the preparation for these Conferences
and the way they reach their conclusions, more effective while retaining th~
Commission s room for manoeuvre. Commission proposals will continue to pro-
vide the basis for discussion at the Conference but the preparatory machinery
should give all parties a chance to state their views on the themes and topics to
be included. The Council should prepare a common position on the papers and
present a united front as far as possible. The procedures for agreeing on and pub-
lishing the conclusions of each Conference should be such as to give the maxi-
mum substance to the debate, and to achieve the greatest possible degree of
commitment for all parties involved.
The  Standing Committee on Employment  has a key role to play in maintaining
contact between both sides of industry and the Ministers responsible for social
affairs in the Community. It can make a ,considerable contribution to follow-up
between Tripartite Conferences and to discussion of other current issues in Com-
munity and national policy. The workers' and employers' representatives should
have the opportunity to express their views in preparation for SEC meetings and
to request the inclusion in the agenda of questions of mutual interest to them.
One way to make this possible would be to hold regular preparatory discussions
in a smaller group, between full SEC meetings, perhaps using the experience
, gained in the handling of Tripartite Conferences.
The various  Joint Committees  bringing together workers' and employers ' repre-
sentatives from sectors where there is a particular Community interest or Euro-
pean dimension have proved their usefulness and should be extended to other
industries where the right conditions exist. Their operation could be further im-
proved to ensure a genuine dialogue and to focus on clearly-defined tasks. One
idea worth considering is that the Economic and Social Committee should take
over from the Commission the task of convening and organizing these meetings.
This would strengthen the ESC'sstanding as the centre of socio-economic con-
sultationsin the Community, and the experience gained could react fruitfully on
the ESC's own studies and debates. The Commission would, of course, continue
to playa key part in the proceedings.VII. Enl.argement
Effects of Enlargement on the Functioning of the Communities
Weare required by our mandate to take into account the prospective enlarge-
ment of the Community to twelve, as well as experience gained .so far. Naturally
our analysis of problems and our specific proposals have been based mainly on
the experience so far gained, where there is a body of factual knowledge to work
on. However, the Community will within a few years contain three new mem-
bers, and this represents a commitment of great historical significance on the
part of all concerned. The full consequences and problems that will flow from it
are to some extent incalculable at present. We cannot do more than draw atten-
tion to the most likely difficulties, and discuss them from the same point of view
as we, have the problems of the present Community. Which solutions will be of
most practical and immediate value, and how can the way be kept open for fur-
ther progress?
We can distinguish two main factors which might hamper the proper functioning
of the institutions after enlargement:
the increase in  numbers  will create problems in itself, as we found with the
first enlargement. Every institution or other body will have more members to
accommodate, more opinions to hear. Costs and administrative complexity
will grow, and so, unless compensating measures are taken , will the  lourdeur
already.so apparent in a Community of Nine.
the range of  interests  to be reconciled will widen. The new members will in-
crease the range of geographical, economic, cultural diversity. They will alter
the balance between North and South, larger and smaller economies. They
will no doubt have strong views of their own on new fields for Community
activity or directions for progress. On some issues their presence might help
improve the conditions for consensus and compromise, but it is only realistic
to expect that on many others new divergences of interest will emerge or old
ones be aggravated.In other words, both the procedural and the substantive obstacles to effective
decision-making in the Communities will be increased, at a time when the purely
administrative load is also very great. It is important to bear in mind here that we
are not talking of a simple, once-for-all transformation. The accession of Greece
will take place at the start of 1981 and that of Portugal and Spain only some
time later so there will not be a single step from a Community of Nine to one of
Twelve. There will be a quite lengthy period when we have a membership of Ten,
when the accession provisions (transitional period, etc.) for Greece need to be
implemented, and the Community is still conducting separate accession negotia-
tions with two other States. This period will demand from the managers of Com-
munity business the greatest possible technical efficiency as well as political sen~
sitivity. It will start just fifteen months after the presentation of our report.
If the Community is to be in good shape to welcome Greece in fifteen months
time, to tackle the tasks of the interim period, and to face up t'? the further new
experiences the arrival of the two remaining States will bring, it must put its own
house in order without delay. We have already said in our chapter on the Com-
mission that the decisive switch to a new membership structure in that institu-
tion should be made not later than January 1981. Most of the other improve-
ments we have suggested need to be introduced well before that if they are to
help matters. In particular, the devices we have proposed for co-ordinated man-
agement of Council business  European Council pronouncements on priorities
Presidency six-month work programmes, progress reports on the lower machin-
ery  should already have become regular practice by the end of 1980. The
Council should be able to welcome its new member with a clear set of rules, a
manageable load of business and a coherent vision of the main tasks the Ten
must undertake together.
General Considerations
We have said there is no magic solution for the problems of the Community of
Nine. There is none for those of the Ten or Twelve either.
One possible  general  approach has been mooted from time to time, and while it
has never reached the stage of formal proposals it needs to be brought out into
the open for examination now. This would be to introduce a permanent and sys-
tematic  differentiation  in the position of various States within the Community, re-
sulting in an implicit or explicit two-tier system. The upper tier or inner core of
strong' States would keep up the pace of integration by participating in all new
policy ventures. Those on the lower level or the fringe would be absolved from
playing a full part at all in the newer policies and would have their legal obliga-
tions adjusted in consequence.We believe this model of development, whether the two-tier effect be deliberate
or merely implicit, must be rejected outright. It goes without saying that any limi-
tation of States institutional  rights to participate in Community business, other
than by the traditional system of 'weightings, is quite out of the question for a
Community that wishes to regard itself as democratic. But a systematic limit on
participation in the  substance  of integration would, in our view, create serious
threats of its own to the cohesion of the Twelve.
It is true that variations in the application of policies exist already among the
Nine. There are long-standing derogations from certain Treaty provisions (e.g. on
capital movements). Special adjusting or compensating devices have been intro-
duced which in practice can apply to only a few States at a time (budget correct-
ing mechanism, subsidized loans for certain participants in the EMS exchange
rate mechanism). The European Monetary System itself is an example of a major
venture in which participation is not at present either uniform or complete. It
would be unrealistic to suppose that the reasons for adopting such solutions in
particular cases will not continue to exist, and indeed be strengthened, in a larger
Community. But the uncontrolled spread of such devices could create new ob-
stacles to free competition and free movement of persons and goods. It could
make the network of varying obligations, and Community jurisprudence in gene-
ral, unworkably complicated. More indirectly, because of some countries greater
interest than others in consultations on executing the partial ventures, it could
lead to the same 'inner' and 'outert circles in decision-making that we have re-
jected above. We believe, therefore, that 'differentiated' solutions should not be
allowed to proliferate either by design or by oversight after enlargement. They
should be adopted only where there is no practical alternative, after careful con-
sideration of the possible ill effects, and the following four principles should al-
ways be applied as a safeguard. First, the measures must be worked out in the
Community framework, with all States participating in discussion. Second, there
must be no damage to the workings of the free market which is the Commun-
ity s most basic common achievement and must remain so. Thirdly, the way
must be left open for States not participating to join the scheme later on. Fourthly,
wherever possible regular review provisions should be included in the measures
to allow any unforeseen divisive effects to be checked. We suggest that the
Commission should take responsibility for monitoring the whole range of varying
obligations and its effects within the Community, and should ring a warning bell
if what should be a random pattern of differing national commitments ever starts
to arrange itself into a two-way split.
M echanica 1/ Proced u rail m provements
It should be clear from the earlier sections of our report that we view the use of
purely mechanical and procedural devices to ease the problems of enlargementwith some reserve. Rules and procedures have not succeeded, among the Six or
the Nine, in making problems of substance go away. They cannot do so in a
larger Community either.
However, it is also part of our argument that good procedures .can and should
ease the resolution of substantive problems. This applies to the Community of
Twelve as much as to a Community of Six or Nine. In selecting the practical pro-
posals made in our preceding sections, we have looked particularly for those
which might compensate, at the administrative level, for the repeated increases
in numbers of participants and complexity of subject matter. The general fea-
tures we consider most relevant to the problems of enlargement are:
the clearer division and identification of responsibilities;
improved co-ordination at both Community and national level;
establishment of political priorities at the highest level, and a rational alloca-
tion of resources tc) carry them out.
Among our more detailed proposals, we might draw attention in this context to:
- more majority decisions on matters not engaging very important interests;
- more delegation of management tasks to the Commission;
- more devolving of decisions to lower levels in the Council hierarchy, including
greater authority for COREPER.
We have also given some thought to the burden which adaptation to Community
procedures may involve for new Member States who have no previous experi-
ence of them. The rules and working methods of the Community institutional
machine have become massively complex and will not be made less so by our
proposals, which are designed rather to ensure transparency and coherence (the
duties of the Presidency are a good example). The burdens involved are heavy
enoug h for the most experienced existing members, whereas new States have to
start from scratch in creating the necessary machinery in Brussels and at home
to play their full part in decision-making. To do this, they need full and objective
information on the tasks they will have to perform and the procedural resources
at their disposal. Some exchange of information does, obviously, take place in
that part of the accession negotiations that concerns the new State s numerical
representation in the institutions. We are not sure that it will be sufficient in it-
self. Our suggestion would be that each new State should be given the option, in
the period following signature of its accession Treaty, to ask for informal briefing
from the Community on the practical day-to-day workings of the institutions, theduties of the Presidency, and so forth. If such requests are received, the Commu-
nity team responsible for the briefing should consist of the Presidency of the
Council and the Secretary-General of the Commission (or their representatives).
languages
The problem of languages already creates serious administrative burdens in a
Community of Nine. It has been put to us that it will cause far greater, perhaps
unmanageable difficulties after enlargement. The factual position is as follows.
The Community of Nine has six official languages, which are guaranteed equal
status in a Regulation dating back to 1958 and amended in 1973. It is expected
that with the accession of new members, the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish
languages will be added to the official list to make a total of nine. The adminis-
trative implicatkms for  translation  of documents are not unmanageable: - about
200-250 translators will need to be recruited for each new language, making an
overall increase (taking all the institutions together) of about 50% in translation
staff. The problem of  interpretation  at meetings is more severe. Simultaneous
interpretation for six into six languages requires 13 - 16 separate interpreters. Si-
multaneous interpretation from nine into nine requires at least 30 people - twice
the previous number. Personnel and running costs (which amounted in 1978 to
about half a billion Belgian francs for the Commission s own linguistic services
and nearly one and a half billion Belgian francs for the Council machinery) will
thus be at least doubled. The present predominance of linguistic tasks within the
apparatus of the various institutions will further increase: already over 60 % of
the personnel employed in the Council, the ESC and the Court of Justice are en-
gaged in linguistic work. To this must be added the expense of adapting old
buildings or providing new ones to accommodate the extra interpreters' booths
and other facilities required. There is a serious risk of declining standards, as
interpreters not possessing all the necessary combinations of languages have to
work at second or third hand through their colleagues.
These facts are daunting. They deserve to be more widely known. But there are
great obstacles in the way of any radical solution. Language is not merely a me-
chanical question, an aspect of business management. It enshrines intellectual
and cultural values which are part of the very fabric of European civilization, re-
flecting the rich variety within a relatively small geographical compass which is
its distinctive achievement. It is no part of the task of the Community to destroy
that variety or to reject the contribution which anyone language or culture has
to make to the common pool. We believe, therefore, that people from all Mem-
ber States who engage in Community activities have a presumptive right to use
their national language to express themselves. An attempt to limit, systematically
and by compulsion, the use of given languages in any area of business would be
unjust as well as politically impractical. In particular, we think it essential that alltexts of a legislative or similar character should be available in all languages
throughout the various stages of discussion since they will ultimately be binding
on all national administrations and their citizens.
On the other hand, the massive costs of a 9 x  interpretQtion regime should
prompt all Governments to consider what scope there may be for flexibility in
practice, and what they might do themselves to limit unnecessary expense. Al-
ready, in the six thousand or so meetings held annually in the framework of the
Council and the Commission, 18 different interpretation regimes (the variants in-
volving no interpretation or passive interpretation only for certain languages) are
used depending on the actual needs of those attending, which may be notified in
advance to the Council Secretariat. Our advice would be that every institution
should go as far as it can - and those with a more static or collegiate member-
ship can no doubt go farther than others  in extending this kind of pragmatic
flexibility, within the clear framework of the basic Regulation.VIII.  Progress towards European Union
In our mandate from the European Council we are invited, among other things,
to  consider the adjustments to the machinery and procedures of the institutions
which are required. . . for progress towards European Union
This last is a term the meaning of which has been hotly contested during the last
few years. Without exhausting the significance with which different observers
may invest it, our. own practical and immediate approach for the purpose of this
Report has been that everything which strengthens the Community's internal
unity, and its unity and that of the Nine in dealings with the rest of the world,
constitutes progress towards European Union.
When we speak of European Union, therefore, we are speaking not so much of a
definite goal as of a direction of movement. We wish to see more and more uni-
ted action in efforts to resolve the manifold problems which now face the Com-
munityitself and its Member States, problems which may well become even
more serious in the years to come.
One cannot speak of solidarity in the abstract. The concept needs to be defined
and measured in relation to the obstacles which will have to be overcome.
We have thus been moved to reflect on the problems which exist today, and on
those which can be expected with a high degree of probability to arise in the
near future. We have attempted to foresee the dangers such a situation could
present for the unity of Europe.
This analysis of the dangers threatening the Community has led us to identify
some of the priorities for action which arise in consequence. We have stressed
above - in the section on the European Council  that the Community will
need to have at every stage a master plan of priorities. We should be glad if our
remarks could serve as a contribution to work on such a plan for the coming
years.Before developing these ideas we should like to make some points which we
consider of crucial importance.
First, the priorities which have been, or may in future be, adopted will not be fix-
ed once and for all. We live in a world of rapid change. The Community must be
capable of adapting to such changes.
Secondly, whatever ~mbitions one may cherish for Europe and its institutions,
Community action cannot be equally effective in all spheres. In some areas it is
hard to see a place for it at all.
In Europe today, the Community possesses only limited functions and powers in
economic, financial and monetary matters. Governments have to contend with
situations varying considerably from one country to another and where economic
considerations are intimately linked with domestic politics. Despite growing inter~
dependence and a more systematic concertation of policies, economic, financial
and monetary decisions are and will most probably remain essentially national in
the period we are examining.
Does this mean that the Community must turn its back on such matters? Cle~rly
it need not, provided it is properly aware of the limits of possible action on .a Eu-
ropean basis. An excess of ambition, particularly when it begins and ends with
mere words, breeds confusion, frustration, and finally indifference.
The Community offers a framework in which all problems, even those which are
beyond its competence, can and should be discussed, as soon as they have
made themselves felt in one or more countries. This discussion need by no
means be purely academic. The European Monetary System, which takes the
form of co-operation between Governments and Central Banks, provides a good
example.
Moreover, there are two unwritten Community rules which are of an importance
comparable with that of the Treaties themselves. Indeed they express the pro-
found solidarity which unites the Community's Member States.
The first rule, which might be called the 'rule of active solidarity', can take num-
erous forms. Some of these are indicated in the Treaties and in subsequent Com-
munity decisions. The rule may be defined as follows: if a Member State finds it-
self in serious difficulty, whether as a result of circumstances, or of the applica-
tion of certain Community rules, or of its own mistakes, it is a question both of
duty and of self-interest for the other Community countries to help it find solu-
tions or to give assistance, by all the means in their power, within a programme
aimed at correcting the situation.The second rule might be defined as the 'rule of passive solidarity . Every Mem-
ber State should refrain, so far as is at all possible, from any act which might di-
rectly or indirectly make life more difficult for other Member States and for the
Community as a whole. We are aware that it is not always practicable to apply
this rule. A State which sets out to reimpose financial discipline can rarely avoid
a temporary slowing-down of activity which causes problems for its associates in
the Community. But every Member State should bear in mind, .in all its important
decisions, the possible consequences of its actions for the Community and the
other Member States. In a Community where the market is integrated to an ever
higher degree, 'boomerang' effects are becoming more and more common.
Whether the measures of solidarity that are required are prescribed by the Treaty
or not, hardly matters. What we are dealing with is mutual aid in the widest
sense of that term. It flows from the very fact of Community membership and
expresses the interest, properly understood, of all the Member States. - In this
way the narrower conception of the Community, coloured by legal formalism
can be left behind and a political concept emerges which reflects the deepest
realities of a Europe in the throes of development.
After these remarks on the essentially national character of economic, financial
and monetary decisions, but also on the profound solidarity which unites the
Member States and which commits them to behaving in all circumstances and to
the very limits of the possible in a communautaire way, we should be able with-
out risk of misapprehension to state the great dangers facing Europe or likely to
face it in the coming years: dangers which must be avoided as the condition of
progress towards European Union.
The Outlook for 1980-1985
Europe has never recovered completely from the profound crisis it went through
in 1974 and 1975. The last few years have been marked by slow growth, high
rates of inflation, substantial unemployment and inadequate investment. At the
time of writing this report, the hopes ofa general economic recovery raised in
1978 have evaporated; inflation has speeded up again and economic activity is
under serious threat.
The origin of the crisis may be traced back to the 1960s. We can see clearly to-
day that the year 1973 was the end of an epoch lasting Menty-five years, in
which Europe had progressed with giant steps amid relative monetary stability.
Growth rates of the order of 5 or 6 % belong, for some countries, to a past era
which Europe cannot expect to relive in the foreseeable future. We shall have to
make do, in the coming years, with considerably lower growth rates, probably
comparable with those we have seen since 1975.Many considerations lead us to this conclusion. We shall note the more impor-
tant ones here.
All countries today are agreed in recognizing inflation as the main threat to com-
bat. Monetary policies are designed with this in mind and budgetary policies
have become more cautious. So long as we do not see a considerable slowing-
down in price rises, there is no point in hoping for a substantial speeding-up of
economic growth. Inflationary expectations are, in fact, still very much with us
and will take several years to calm down.
Rates of inflation are high everywhere, but they differ considerably from country
to country, varying from about 4 to 16 or 17%. Combined with a great abundance
of international liquidity, this situation gives rise to profound monetary disturb-
ances. The exchange market is periodically shaken by violent upheavals, which
lead a considerable number of Governments and Central Banks to take restrictive
measures to protect their currency.
Finally, the tensions in the energy market are aggravating an already very difficult
situation. The year 1979 will be remembered for the second crisis of the decade
in this area. The rise in oil prices which has just taken place is producing effects
comparable with those of 1973 -1974; it boosts inflation, depresses economic
activity and causes fundamental upsets in balances of payments. It would take a
great deal of optimism to suppose that this crisis is the last. We must be prepar-
ed for a situation in which, on the contrary, oil prices will continue to rise in the
coming years both in nominal and in real terms.
The chief reason for this is that .in the period in question, even on the hypothesis
of a relatively low rate of general economic growth, the balance of supply and
demand in the oil market will be precarious. It is hard to see the producers, taken
globally, being willing or able to increase substantially the flow of supplies. 
the other hand, a slow growth in demand will continue. Any political upset in the
Middle East would inevitably provoke a crisis of supply.
These various factors - the fight against inflation, monetary disturbances, rising
energy prices  lead us to conclude that Europe will have a low economic
growth rate in the coming years.
Europe will have to come to terms with this situation. But there will be great dif-
ficulties on the employment front. The relatively low growth rate will in fact, be
combined  at least up to the middle of the next decade - with a rapid growth
in the working population, to produce a high level of unemployment. Serious so-
cial and political tensions will result. In all these ways, the coming years will be
very difficult ones.Dangers forthe Community
The Community is thus confronted with a situation of crisis, not only now but in
the future. As a result tensions are already appearing, and may well in the near
future be exacerbated, both within the Community and in its relations with the
rest of the world.
The most obvious is the competition among Member States to guarantee them-
selves supplies of oil or natural gas which will allow them to maintain the maxi-
mum level of economic activity. This danger would be particularly great in the
case of disturbances in one or another oil producing country, which could bring
a fresh interruption in supplies for a longer or shorter period.
It is inevitable that all industrialized countries will strive to compensate the in-
creased cost of their oil imports by increasing their exports to the utmost. If in
addition they can enlarge their share of the international market they will achieve
the dual benefit of lower unemployment and a stronger balance of payments.
Those that are least successful in the race to export may be forced back on .at-
tempts to limit their imports.
So long as the means used by Community .countries to boost exports or reduce
imports do not violate the rules of the Treaties, no Treaty objection can be raised
against them. But the absence of Treaty objections will not prevent tensions aris~
ing within the Community. The danger of protectionist measures, notably by the
increase of State aids to public and private enterprises, can by no means be
ignored.
This risk becomes even more obvious in the Community's relations with develop-
ing .countries, above all those which are constructing highly competitive indus-
tries. In a Europe enjoying rapid growth, it would have been relatively easy to ab-
sorb the new output of these countries. In a Europe of low growth and high
unemployment, the problem will be politically much more difficult. We have al-
ready seen measures taken designed to regulate some imports from developing
countries. It should however be the objective to keep the European market as
open as possible to developing countries' industrial products.
This problem takes on a special colouring for the Community in the perspective
of enlargement. Spain, Greece and Portugal are countries which have not reach-
ed the same degree of industrialization as the North of Europe, though Spain
industrial economy is both larger and more advanced than that of the other two
prospective members. It will take much political intelligence from all members of
the enlarged Community to resolve the problems of adjustment which will flow
from enlargement. The firm decisions made both to apply for membership and to
extend membership demonstrates the determination of each of the Twelve to
show exactly that political intelligence.Finally, it is hard to conceive of a world of high and divergent inflation rates and
substantial balance of payments disequilibria without major monetary disturban-
ces such as we have experienced since 1971. The dollar is likely to remain at the
centre of these upsets, since it is by far the currency most widely used in nation-
al reserves and as a medium of exchange.
It is also the currency of the most powerful economy in the world and, as such
inevitably influenced by considerations of American domestic policy. It is incon-
ceivable that, at certain moments, these internal obligations will not conflict with
the need for a stable international currency. The position is parallel to that 
which the pound sterling found itself not so very long ago.
The dominating role of the dollar makes any instability particularly serious for Eu-
rope and the rest of the world. It affects not only the parity relations between
the dollar and other currencies, but also, in many ways, the relations of those
currencies with each other. 
European Union
It is through the efforts of the Community and its States to tackle the dangers of
which we have given a far from exhaustive list that European Union, however
one defines it, will be built. We shall try now to list some of the imperatives
which should dominate the actions of both States and Community in the course
of the next few years.
The first priority .is the maintenance and consolidation of the Community s co-
hesion and that of its members, so that the Community  acquis  notably the
free movement of industrial and agricultural goods, of services, capital and lab-
our and the common policies serving these goals - may be preserved. This
basic aim should not, obviously, exclude the changes which may turn out to be
needed on one or another particular point. There is, for example, the need to
correct certain imperfections in the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy.
The consolidation and development of the Community will demand a very high
capacity for adaptation to a world which is constantly being transformed.
All the great problems facing a united Europe today  whether we think of
monetary stability, energy supplies or the new international division of labour 
are world problems, which frequently require negotiations and agreements at
world level or with particular economic units outside the Community: the USA,
Japan, EFTA, Eastern Asia, the oil producers and the non-oil-producing develop-
ing countries. It is desirable that the Community and the Nine should, in these
various relationships, act as a united body.Economic problems and political problems are closely linked. Hence the impor-
tance which attaches to the maintenance and strengthening of political co-ope-
ration. Unity in .economic negotiations with the outside world, and enhanced po~
litical co-operation, will give Europe greater weight in the world at large and offer
her, her only chance of influencing the course of affairs.
Another imperative, already mentioned above, is that of solidarity. A Community
which failed to stick together in adversity would be a Community no longer.
However much intelligence we apply to tackling our problems, it is clear that the
Community is bound to go through some difficult moments in the coming years.
This will almost certainly apply to the supply of energy, a commodity with which
not all Member States are equally provided. Competition for . energy supplies
must not be allowed to degenerate into a rivalry destroying all idea of Commun-
ity solidarity. We do not wish here to suggest any particular rules. But it should
be accepted that the misfortune of some must be the misfortune of all. It must
be a priority for all Governments to co-ordinate at Community level their national
efforts to economize on energy and develop alternative sources.
The possibility of an energy shortage emphasizes the need for Community solida-
rity. An energy shortage should activate the obligation for mutual aid. This would
apply equally to other crisis situations which cannot be foreseen at present. Mu-
tual aid may not in every case be a Community matter, but the Community s abi-
lity to contribute effectively to the solution of such problems will depend on the
extent of its financial resourGes and on the willingness of Member States to see
them used. A Community contribution to mutual aid may need to take the form
of grants, loans, guarantees and interest subsidies and may need to exceed the
Community s present possibilities given present commitments. We are aware of
course that proposals to increase Community resources raise a variety of pro-
blems which the Community has not yet resolved.
Concrete and limited actions are possible in the areas sometimes defined in a ra-
ther ambitious way as 'industrial policy
, '
regional policy' or ' social policy . We
are thoroughly in favour, in these areas as in the case of energy, of any action
which is precise, well-defined, and a clear expression of the unity of the Commu-
nity. One obvious example is the policy which the Commission, with Council
support, has followed for the reconstruction of the Community steel industry.
But we must put Member States and institutions on their guard against over~
large or ill-defined projects, in whatever area of policy they may be proposed
which would be ill-suited to the Community s present stage of development, and
would consume quantities of money and effort without appreciable results. Such
projects must be defensible on their own merits and certainly should not be ad-
vocated as a means of correcting budgetary imbalances in the Community.Finally, the EMS has been found by eight Member States to be the most effec-
tive means, if not of unifying their economic and monetary policies, at least of al~
lowing them to converge towards joint objectives of stability. It is seen as 
powerful factor for discipline. Without guaranteeing that Governments will effec-
tively resist pressures which irresponsible political elements will constantly exert
upon them, it does provide arguments for doing so as well as an objective mea-
sure of the divergences resulting from national economic behaviour or errors of
policy.
The EMS represents for its participants considerable progress over the regime of
floating rates. The EMS provides for regular reviews in determining its further de-
velopment.
The few thoughts set out above on progress towards European Union may ap-
pear to some to be insufficiently ambitious. Our answer to this is two~fold. On
the one hand, the European Council asked us to provide specific proposals which
could be implemented swiftly. On the other hand, the present time seems to us
ill-suited to futuristic visions which presuppose a profound and rapid transforma-
tion of attitudes within the Community. The chance of such a transformation in
the next few years seems to us exceedingly slight. We have preferred to concen-
trate our reflections on a few more specific ideas, designed to protect the Com-
munity against the dangers which constantly threaten it in an uncertain world
while at the same time preparing the ground for further progress.ANNEX 1
Text of the Mandate
As a follow-up to the proposal made by the President of the French Republic, the Euro-
pean Council has agreed to call upon a number of eminent persons with special knowledge
of European affairs to give thought to such affairs.
The Committee thus f()rmed is made up of the following persons:
Mr Barend BIESHEUVEL
Mr Edmund DELL
Mr Robert MARJOLIN.
The European Council invites the Committee to consider the adjustments to the machinery
and procedures of the institutions which are required for the proper operation of the Com-
munities on the basis of and in compliance with the Treaties, including their institutional ar~
rangements, and for progress towards European Union. It emphasizes the interest it attach-
es to having available specific proposals in this connection which may be implemented
ftly and which take into account experience to date and the prospective enlargement to
twelve.
The European Council requests the Committee to report back on its conclusions when the
Council meets in October 1979.ANNEX 2
Harmonization
Its Scope and institutional Effects
1. Article 3 of the European Economic Community Treaty, which lists the main activities of
the Community, includes:
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the
proper functioning of the common market.
The activity known as 'approximation of laws' - or more often
, '
harmonization' - thus
relates in the first place to the removal of actual or potential barriers to trade in the .com-
mon customs area. The bulk of harmonization measures are Directives adopted under Art-
icle 100 of the European Economic Community Treaty, establishing common standards for
the production of certain industrial goods (or for certain industrial practices) so that these
goods may be accepted in trade between all Member States. The Treaties also prescribe
harmonization as a means of achieving specific goals in other areas such as customs pol-
icy, agriculture, free movement of persons, social policy, taxation and so on. Recently pro-
posals for 'harmonization' measures have come forward in areas of new policy develop-
ment where they are based less directly on Treaty provisions: environment, consumer pro-
tection etc.
2. Harmonization proposals are numerous and their adoption involves long processes of
consultation and negotiation. Blockages can arise at many points. Statistics show that a
high proportion of the delays burdening the Council machinery have arisen on proposals of
this type: two-thirds of the proposals put forward by the Commission before 1976 which
had still not been adopted by the Council in February 1979 were in the field of harmoniza-
tion. Thirty proposals in the industrial harmonization area had been under discussion for
six years or more.
The Path to Improvement
3. None of the purely procedural problems involved in harmonization is unique. They can
be alleviated to a great extent by applying suggestions in the main body of our report
rationalizing the Commission s consultation practices;better control of the lower-level Council machinery by the Council itself and COREPER,
including monitoring and referral upwards of blocked dossiers;
greater use of the delegation procedure (reflected for example in the establishment of
Technical Progress Committees for up-dating harmonization Directives).
4. The greatest single contribution to rel.ieving the load placed by harmonization on the in-
stitutions would, however, be an effort by the Commission to rationalize the flow of its pro-
posals in the first place. Here as everywhere else, clear priorities must be asserted. Harmo-
nization, perhaps more than any other Community activity except the CAP, affects millions
of ordinary people in their daily lives and has a quite disproportionate effect in forming their
image of the Community. The institutions must demonstrate that what they are doing is
done for good reason and that any expense and inconvenience involved is justified by spe-
cific benefits in view.
Suggestions
5. The best and simplest principle on which the Commission might base and justify its har-
monization policy is as follows. The removal of barriers to trade which materially hamper
the functioning of the common market ~ with the other spcific instances mentioned in the
Treaty  is the starting point for all harmonization activity and the one incontestable prior-
ity. Any proposal not directly connected with these specific aims will have to be separately
justified on its merits.
6. Even where a non-tariff barrier to trade indisputably exists the Community s response
should not be rigid or automatic.
If a State has caused the barrier by its own action, it must show that it meets the criteria in
Article 36 of the European Economic Community Treaty: if not, the Commission must not
shrink from infraction proceedings. Full use should be made of the ' standstill' procedure
(under which the introduction of a new national standard is delayed while other States
seek to adapt their own standards or agree on Community ones) and the period of the
standstill' might sometimes be extended. If a particular barrier only affects trade between
two States, bilateral arrangements might be considered as a temporary solution, with the
option of widening them into a Community agreement as others start to trade in the same
goods.
7. If it wishes to introduce a harmonization measure in a field not directly related to trade
or to other specific dispositions of the Treaty, the Commission should give particular
thought to its practical as well as theoretical justification and should be able to make a logi-
cal case to the other institutions.
8. The form of harmonization Directives should be flexible enough to achieve the best pos-
sible conditions for early agreement and the greatest possible practical effectiveness in
each particular case. Sometimes complete and obligatory harmonization is the only appro-
priate route. In many other cases, however, good results can be achieved by starting off
with 'optional' harmonization , or with a very general Directive giving States leeway and
time gradually to adapt their practices, or alternatively with a small specific measure dealing
only with the salient problem in a particular field.ANNEX 3
The Conciliation Procedure: Administrative Improvements
1. This note contains suggestions for easing the practical problems that have arisen in the
implementation of the 'conciliation' procedure since early 1978. By 'conciliation' we mean
the process of consultation on certain legislative proposals between Council and Parlia~
ment, with Commission participation, which was inaugurated by a Joint Declaration of the
institutions  on  4 March 1975. Nothing said here applies to the quite differ~nt process of
concertation on the Community Budget.
2. The main practical problems in implementing 'conciliation' have been:
disputes over whether particular measures were eligible for applying the process;
delay in organizing meetings, after it has been agreed to apply conciliation;
difficulties in reaching agreement at the meetings themselves, so that 'conciliation
has continued for many months  and  the adoption of the measures in question been de-
layed;
difficulties of co-ordination between conciliation exercises running concurrently in
which similar issues are at stake.
Some of these practical problems undoubtedly reflect deeper differences of view between
institutions (and perhaps States) on the true purpose and implications of the conciliation
procedure. This is not a dispute which we  can  resolve;  and  while it lasts no purely adminis-
trative improvements can guarantee that operation of the procedure will be trouble-free.
Insofar as the difficulty lies in certain ambiguities of the Joint Declaration itself, failure to
find  an  accommodation between the different approaches could ultimately leave no alterna-
tive but to re-negotiate the Declaration - with all that would involve. At best, our practical
suggestions for easing the situation might help to avert such an extreme solution.
Suggestions: Role of the Council Presidency
3. Experience suggests conciliation has worked best when the Council, in preparing its
common position, has taken Parliament's Opinion into account from the start. This allows
differences of view to be anticipated and either avoided in advance or covered by arational negotiating strategy. Informal contact between the Presidencies of the institutions
has also proved most useful both before, during and after the actual conciliation meetings.
Since the responsibility for action lies in both cases largely with the Council Presidency,
one obvious way to improvement is to define the latter s special duties in conciliation and
make sure they are executed consistently.
4. These Presidency duties should include:
(i) drawing the Parliament' s Opinion on a conciliable measure to the attention of Member
States from the very earliest stages of Council work (Le. from working group level);
(ii) raising the question of a strategy for conciliation at an equally early stage, before the
Council's position on the issues becomes rigidly fixed (this is perhaps the single most
important point);
(Hi) Discussing the problems and possible solutions informally with the Parliament, before a
conciliation meeting actually takes place;
(iv) providing Member States with the necessary documents, including1)ossiblecompro-
mise formulae, wallin advance of each meeting;
(v) conducting informal negotiations for compromise, both within the Council and with the
Parliament, as the procedure continues.
Where a Member State has allotted a share of its Presidency duties to a junior Minister, he
should take a special interest in the administration of the conciliation procedure at all lev-
els, and stand ready to act as a mediator himself in the closing stages. He should work
very closely in this with the Commission, who play an essential role in mediating and clari-
fying the issues.
Co-ordination
5. The handling of conciliation proceedings on different pieces of legislation needs to be
well co-ordinated, on both sides. Where similar issues are at stake in parallel exercises the
solutions found must be compatible. Furthermore, the procedure itself should be consis-
tently applied: to reinterpret the Joint Declaration afresh each time is wasteful and multi-
ples opportunities for dispute.
6. COREPER, supported in detailed work by the General Affairs Group, has come to playa
key role in such co-ordination on the Council side. This role must be clearly recognized and
reinforced. The substance of the Council's 'common position' will still have to be discussed
, in the specialized bodies responsible for the policy areas in question. But these groups
should produce conclusions in good time, so that Permanent Representatives (or their De-
puties) - who will accompany their Ministers to the actual conciliation meeting - can re-
view the negotiating position and give a more ' political' steer.
7. We would not favour giving one Council, Le. that for General Affairs, the task of con-
ducting all conciliation meetings. It is right for Ministers in the specialized Councils involvedto gain direct experience of dialogue with the Parliament. But where a junior Minister is
specially responsible for Presidency duties involving the Parliament it is sensible for him 
least to attend all conciliation meetings and give the benefit of his procedural expertise.
8. The directly elected Parliament will no doubt consider what internal arrangements are
needed to obtain the benefits of co-ordination on its own side.
The Time limit
9. The greatest difficulty in conciliation so far has been in finding and applying a reason-
able interpretation of the indication in the Joint Declaration that the process should only
take three months. The three-month limit has been overstepped more often than not
sometimes to a dramatic extent, and this brings uncertainty and a risk of wasted effort for
all the institutions involved.
10. It would be wrong and impractical for either Councilor Parliament to try to enforce 
firmer deadline unilaterally. A solution must be found in agreement between all three insti-
tutions involved. As a basis for discussion, we might offer the following illustrative ap-
proach:
(a) When the Council's common position on a conciliable measure has been sent to the
Parliament, the latter should indicate within a set period (e.g. six weeks) whether it
wants to hold a conciliation meeting.
(b) The time limit for completion of the procedure runs from the date of the first meeting.
(c) The procedure should stop after  either  three months  or  three meetings between the in-
stitutions, whichever is the shorter.
(d) If, when the deadline is reached, either institution wants to go on, the Presidencies of
the Council and the Parliament should try to reach agreement on a suitable extension.
If the institutions cannot agree on an extension, the procedure is terminated.European Communities - Council
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The European Council instructed a committee consisting of Mr Biesheuvel, Mr Dell and
Mr Marjolin to examine what adjustments could be made to the mechanisms and procedures
of the institutions of the European Communities. Following its examination, this committee
known as the ' Committee of Wise Men , drew up a report which contains a critical analysis of
the Community institutions and proposes necessary adjustments. In November 1979 it submit-
, ted this report to the European Council, which decided to have it published.